U.S. Sanctions are Dictating Who Gets Aid and Essentials in Cuba

Sep 22

Written By CEDA The Center for Engagement and Advocacy in the Americas

The Trump administration is increasingly shaping the channels through which goods, fuel, investment, and humanitarian assistance can reach Cuba. Although U.S. sanctions contain humanitarian exemptions, those provisions alone do not ensure that aid is distributed evenly or in a timely manner. At the same time, Washington has expanded certain channels for transactions intended to benefit Cuba’s private sector while tightening restrictions on transactions involving Cuba’s government, military-linked entities, and other sanctioned actors.

The administration’s humanitarian assistance illustrates both sides of this approach. Washington has pledged $100 million in humanitarian aid for distribution through independent organizations, including Caritas Cuba. Yet shortages of delivery trucks, gasoline, and financial infrastructure severely limit its impact on the ground.

Those constraints extend beyond U.S.-funded assistance. Millions of dollars of regional, multilateral, and private humanitarian aid have been stranded or unable to be transported, creating a bottleneck in which aid authorized by Washington can take months to reach the people who need it the most. Questions have also emerged about the capacity and selection of some organizations receiving U.S. humanitarian contracts, including Samaritan’s Purse, an evangelical humanitarian organization whose founder, Franklin Graham, has a longstanding relationship with President Trump and has secured a $40 million federal contract to distribute humanitarian assistance in Cuba. With the U.S. embassy announcing a shipment is due to arrive within the next few weeks, the question of how this aid will be distributed and by whom remains imperative.

Sanctions intended to impact Cuba’s government have instead caused chain reactions that harm Cubans and their ability to access both humanitarian aid and daily necessities. Shipping provides perhaps the clearest illustration of the gap between formal exemptions and practical access. Following the May 1 executive order expanding restrictions on Cuba, two major shipping companies, Hapag-Lloyd and CMA CGM, suspended bookings to and from the island, citing compliance risks. Their suspension of operations affected up to 60 percent of Cuba's shipping traffic, leaving thousands of containers carrying United Nations assistance, cancer drugs from the World Health Organization, medical supplies from Aid for the Caribbean, solar panels, and other critical supplies, unable to be transported. CMA CGM has since resumed limited services.

At the same time, trade through certain U.S.-authorized channels has expanded dramatically. Total U.S. goods exports to Cuba reached $674 million during the first seven months of 2026. In one area in particular, U.S. exports are surging: the energy sector. In 2025, U.S. fuel and oil exports to Cuba were valued at $311,558; in the first seven months of 2026, they reached $156.9 million. In June alone, U.S. companies’ shipments of petroleum products to Cuba reached 778,000 barrels. Even so, these shipments have not been enough to offset Cuba’s loss of fuel supplies from Venezuela and Mexico, leaving the island’s overall energy supply under significant pressure.

A similar reordering is emerging in the mining sector. Following the new U.S. sanctions, Sherritt International, the Canadian firm that had run Cuba's Moa nickel and cobalt operations for three decades, suspended its venture. Two U.S.-backed investor groups are now competing for control of Cuba's mineral resources. If either company succeeds, it would mark the first time U.S. capital has controlled Cuban mining assets in roughly sixty years.

New reporting by the Miami Herald suggests the administration hoped to strike a deal earlier this year that would position U.S. companies as the island's major oil suppliers. In exchange, Cuba’s government would need to implement changes including the privatization of CUPET, Cuba’s state-owned energy company, and the departure of President Miguel Díaz-Canel. However, the report alleges that such talks broke down, citing opposition within the Cuban American community to aspects of a potential agreement. While the U.S. government has not commented on these reports, Cuba’s Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla has since stated there are currently no negotiations or planned talks with Washington.

The U.S. government has stated that these sanctions are not intended to disrupt the delivery of essentials to the Cuban people. Yet, formal humanitarian authorization is only one part of the question of whether goods can actually reach the island and move through it. Sanctions can contribute to overcompliance by banks, shipping companies, and other private actors. Additionally, secondary sanctions are forcing businesses to leave Cuba altogether, deterred by the perceived commercial and financial risk of doing business there, leaving economic and infrastructure gaps.

A humanitarian exemption on paper does not, by itself, produce a shipping company willing to carry a container, a bank willing to process a transaction, or the fuel and transportation capacity needed to move supplies once they arrive. As Cuba’s humanitarian crisis deepens, with eight in 10 Cuban households now living on the margins of survival and the country experiencing its seventh nationwide blackout this year, the distinction between allowing aid in principle and making it possible to deliver aid at scale has become increasingly consequential.

U.S.-CUBA NEWS

U.S. Expands Sanctions on Cuba’s Military and Nickel Sectors

On September 17, the U.S. Department of State announced an eighth round of sanctions designations targeting eight Cuban entities and three individuals, which the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added to its Specially Designated Nationals List. In a press statement, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the administration “will not stand by as Cuba’s elite enrich themselves through resource extraction.”

Four of the entities are involved in military research and development: the Military Projects and Research Company (SIMPRO), Naval Research and Development Center (CIDNAV), Aviation Research and Development Center (CIDAI), and Military Communications and Electronics Group (GELCOM). Three officials who direct military research entities—Joaquín Francisco Cancio Monteagudo, Dioglis Pedrera Argüello, and Julio Hurtado Betancourt—were also designated.

The remaining four entities operate in Cuba’s nickel and mining industries: the Nickel Construction Services Company (SERCONI), Nickel Projects Center (CEPRONIQUEL), Nickel Research Center (CEDINIQ), and Pinares S.A. The latest designations follow previous designations on August 20 and September 3, which also targeted entities involved in Cuba’s mining sector and its supporting supply chains. The newly designated nickel entities provide technical services, coordinate engineering projects, conduct industrial research, and perform geological surveys, while the four military entities conduct research and development for Cuba’s armed forces.

Because Cuba’s nickel sector generates hard-currency revenue, sanctions-related losses in nickel production or revenue could reduce Cuba’s ability to finance imports. With Cubans continuously facing widespread shortages and an increasingly fragile electrical grid, additional losses in production and foreign revenue could deepen food, medicine, fuel, and electricity shortages.

Guyana Receives Cuban Deportees For the First Time

On September 4, Guyana received its first flight carrying third-country nationals deported from the US, including four Cuban and two Afghan nationals, under a one-year third-country deportation agreement. Guyana’s Foreign Secretary Robert Persaud said that Guyanese authorities screened and approved the deportees before their transfer, and that none had criminal backgrounds. Guyana has described the arrangement as “temporary in nature and does not constitute permanent resettlement,” and said it will accept only individuals who voluntarily choose relocation to the country.

Under the agreement, the US will bear the full costs of relocating, receiving, housing, and supporting migrants accepted by Guyana, with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) administering those services and providing additional support through its Assisted Voluntary Programme. Individuals relocated through the agreement will remain in Guyana while their immigration status is determined. They may ultimately return to their countries of origin or relocate elsewhere of their choosing, but officials have not explained how these decisions will be made.

A non-binding diplomatic note issued by Guyana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation states that the deportees will not face torture or persecution in Guyana or be sent somewhere they could face those risks. Guyana has no national asylum legislation, however, and has not publicly explained how officials will assess whether a deportee could face harm upon return.

Guyana joins more than 30 countries that have signed third-country deportation agreements with the US. The agreement expands the Trump administration’s use of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to receive migrants who are not their nationals.

Judge Authorizes ICE to Force-Feed Cuban Hunger Striker

On August 19, federal judge Andrew Hanen authorized U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to involuntarily feed an unnamed Cuban man on a hunger strike at the Montgomery ICE Processing Center near Houston. ICE arrested the man on July 22, and he began a hunger strike three days later.

When detainees take part in hunger strikes, ICE has previously received federal authorization to conduct force-feeding through a tube inserted through the nose. However, this order additionally authorized a surgically inserted abdominal tube. According to The Guardian, this method of force-feeding had not previously been identified in publicly documented ICE cases. Court records indicate that he was likely fed through a nasal tube in August, but the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) said he has since resumed eating and drinking and is no longer being force-fed.

Most of the court records remain sealed and the man did not have legal representation during the proceedings. His case reflects a growing access-to-counsel problem in immigration court, where the share of completed cases involving legal representation fell from 48 percent during FY2021-FY2024 to 38 percent as of the end of February 2025. This is likely the 19th case since January 2025 in which ICE received authorization to conduct involuntary medical procedures on a hunger striker.

U.S. Coast Guard Repatriates 14 Cuban Migrants

On September 3, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted a vessel carrying 15 Cuban migrants approximately 13 miles west of Elbow Cay, The Bahamas. One migrant was medically evacuated to shore, while the remaining 14 were held in Coast Guard custody until their repatriation to Cuba on September 10. This was the Coast Guard’s first announced repatriation of Cuban migrants since June 25, when it returned 27 migrants after intercepting their vessel in the Yucatán Channel heading to Mexico.

Somali Migrants Held at Guantánamo Bay

According to two Minnesota men currently detained at Guantánamo Bay, as many as 12 Somali migrants have passed through U.S. detention facilities at the base in recent weeks. Eight migrants arrived on a flight on August 26 and remain there as of September 15. The men said ICE initially told them that Guantánamo would be only a refueling stop during their deportation to Somalia, but they instead have been detained there for weeks. Three detainees interviewed by Sahan Journal said they had pursued asylum claims and held U.S. work permits. They described aggressive shackling, persistent cold, continuous surveillance, and limited communication with their attorneys and families.

Since February 2025, more than 800 migrants have been held at Guantánamo Bay, but fewer than 40 have been detained there at any given time over the last eight months.

Cuban American Rep. Salazar Criticizes Trump’s Immigration Policy

Cuban American Representative María Elvira Salazar (FL-27) recently criticized President Donald Trump’s immigration enforcement in a new campaign advertisement. Speaking outside the White House, Rep. Salazar said President Trump had promised to prioritize immigrants with criminal backgrounds, but that his administration was also detaining people who had not committed crimes. She also cited data indicating that 50,000 migrants detained in July had no criminal record. This raises concerns for an estimated half a million Cubans living in uncertainty, many of whom were released with I-220A forms that do not provide legal status or eligibility for permanent residency under the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA).

Rep. Salazar’s immigration record combines support for pathways to legal status with votes to expand immigration enforcement. She co-sponsored the bipartisan Dignity Act of 2025, which would provide renewable legal status to qualifying undocumented immigrants. However, Rep. Salazar also voted for the Laken Riley Act in 2025, which expanded mandatory detention for certain undocumented migrants arrested for or charged with specified crimes. She later voted for the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which provided $45 billion to expand immigration detention capacity and $29.85 billion for additional ICE operations. Those votes came as immigration enforcement intensified in Florida: from December 19, 2025, through March 10, 2026, ICE’s Miami field office recorded nearly 10,000 arrests, the highest total of any ICE field office in the country during that period.

IN CUBA

Cuba Suffers Seventh Nationwide Blackout After Power Grid Collapse

On September 18, Cuba suffered another nationwide blackout after its national electrical grid suffered a total collapse, affecting approximately 9 million people. The Ministry of Energy and Mines announced the collapse on social media, but did not immediately identify the specific failure that triggered it. The outage follows multiple nationwide grid failures that occurred earlier in March, July, and August, but electricity interruptions are now routine even when the national grid remains online, with rolling blackouts regularly leaving millions without power. Fuel shortages, deteriorating infrastructure, a lack of long-term investment, and the U.S.-imposed de facto oil blockade have continued to strain generating capacity. Prolonged outages have reshaped daily life, disrupting schools, work, food storage, water supplies, and healthcare. The nationwide failure will intensify these disruptions as Cubans continue to face an increasingly fragile electrical grid.

Cuba’s Government Opens First Privately Operated Currency Exchange

On September 14, the first privately operated currency exchange authorized by Cuba’s government opened in Santa Clara as a pilot project supervised by the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC). The BCC said that data from the exchange’s completed currency transactions would help the bank refine its official exchange rate. The BCC has received additional applications, suggesting that the model could develop into a wider network of privately operated exchanges competing with state institutions and the informal market.

According to elTOQUE, the exchange is operated by ADT 64—a private business registered to provide food services rather than currency exchange. On September 15, the business posted rates of 710 pesos to buy and 730 pesos to sell one U.S. dollar, both above the government's official rate. However, customers told elTOQUE that the business was only purchasing foreign currency despite displaying selling rates. The pilot project extends private participation in a market previously controlled by state institutions, but questions remain about its licensing, ownership, rate-setting methodology, and ability to sell foreign currency.

This new policy could make it easier for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) to access foreign currency to pay overseas suppliers, an issue they have long struggled with. However, access may remain limited as reporting suggests customers initially could mainly sell foreign currency rather than reliably purchase it. Ordinary Cubans will likely see little impact from this development given that most exchange foreign currency through informal markets.

State Hotel Chain Opens Bidding for Spaces Across Ten Tourism Facilities

On September 14, Cuba’s state-owned hotel chain Islazul opened a bidding process for economic actors to manage restaurants, bars, cafeterias, terraces, and other spaces across 10 tourism facilities in Santiago de Cuba. The spaces are being offered through leasing, cooperation, or consignment arrangements. The move comes as Cuba’s tourism sector adjusts to the departure of foreign hotel operators following the Trump administration’s expanded sanctions targeting Cuban state-linked entities.

The shift is significant for Islazul because the state hotel chain had previously prioritized foreign investment and management agreements. In 2019, the company said it was seeking foreign partners, particularly for management agreements that could provide financing and marketing. At the time, Islazul had a management contract with Spanish hotel chain Meliá and was negotiating with other foreign operators. That model has become more difficult as foreign hotel operators have faced increased U.S. sanctions exposure for doing business with the Cuban state. Meliá, which had managed 34 properties on the island, ended its operations in Cuba this year following the expansion of U.S. sanctions.

With foreign operators retreating, the government is increasingly turning to Cuban non-state actors to operate spaces that remain under state ownership. The change builds on a 2022 Ministry of Domestic Trade resolution that, according to 14ymedio, permits non-state economic actors to operate underused or deteriorating establishments while the properties remain under ownership of the government.

The bidding process is part of the economic reform package approved in June, which expanded private participation in tourism and opened hotel management to Cuban investors living on and off the island. In August, Cuba’s government also approved a decree-law establishing bidding as a method of selecting state and non-state actors to manage state-owned spaces and productive capacity.

Cuba Introduces 10,000 and 20,000 Peso Banknotes

On September 16, the Central Bank of Cuba introduced new 10,000- and 20,000-peso banknotes, following the issuance of 2,000- and 5,000-peso notes in March. The bank said the larger denominations would meet growing demand for cash, reduce processing costs, and make transactions involving large sums more efficient. Rising prices and the peso’s depreciation have made even routine purchases require increasingly large quantities of cash.

Within six months, Cuba’s highest-denomination banknote has increased from 1,000 to 20,000 pesos. The new notes arrived as official annual inflation reached approximately 25 percent and the dollar rose to 700 pesos in the informal market. Although the notes will reduce the number of bills needed for withdrawals and payments, they will not increase the purchasing power or resolve the country’s cash shortage, which has been fueled by inflation, distrust in banks, and businesses holding pesos outside the banking system.

CUBA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

Costa Rica Opens Regularization Program for Cuban Migrants

Costa Rica began accepting applications on September 1 for a temporary immigration category available to Nicaraguan, Venezuelan, Cuban, and Colombian nationals whose applications for refugee status remain unresolved or were rejected. The category creates another legal pathway in a country where UNHCR recorded 1,788 Cuban refugees and 8,833 asylum-seekers in 2025. Costa Rica’s General Directorate of Migration and Immigration estimates that the program could regularize approximately 10,000 migrants, although Director General Omer Badilla said the actual number could be higher. The application period will remain open through September 1, 2027.

Under the official resolution, applicants must have requested refugee status between June 1, 2014, and May 7, 2026, and remained in Costa Rica continuously after submitting their application. People who already hold another approved immigration status or have a separate regularization application will not be eligible. Successful applicants will receive legal status for two years, which can be renewed for additional two-year periods with no limit, and authorization to work legally in Costa Rica.

The special category does not automatically grant status, and applicants must undergo a review and meet eligibility and documentation requirements. For eligible Cuban migrants, the measure could provide greater legal stability and access to formal employment in Costa Rica even if they are not recognized as refugees.

In March 2026, Costa Rica closed its embassy in Havana and requested the withdrawal of Cuba’s diplomatic personnel from its capital, San José. Costa Rica’s Foreign Minister recently confirmed the diplomatic break, denied the decision stemmed from U.S. pressure, and called Cuba’s government a “vile tyranny”.

Cuba Searches for Economic Openings at BRICS Summit

Cuba participated as a partner country in the eighteenth Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) Summit, held in New Delhi on September 12 and 13. BRICS is an intergovernmental organization that now includes 11 emerging and developing economies, promoting economic and political cooperation among its members. The recent summit’s New Delhi Declaration raised concerns about the effects of tightened economic, commercial, and financial restrictions on Cuba, including their impact on the country’s economy, energy, supplies, and population.

In August, Cuba’s Embassy in Moscow said the country wanted to move from partner status to full BRICS membership and was seeking Russia’s support. Russia’s embassy in Havana later said that admitting new full members was not currently on the bloc’s agenda. However, partner status provides no voting rights or guaranteed access to BRICS financing, which Cuba’s government especially needs. During the summit, Cuba’s Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla criticized U.S. sanctions and argued that the international financial system disadvantages developing countries.

On the summit’s sidelines, Mr. Rodríguez Parrilla met with Vietnamese Prime Minister Le Minh Hung to discuss cooperation on food production, solar energy, and pharmaceuticals, as well as obstacles affecting Vietnamese investments in Cuba. Mr. Rodríguez Parrilla also met with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to discuss bilateral relations and cooperation. No concrete commitments resulting from either meeting were publicly announced.

For Cuba’s government, the summit’s practical value lies less in forming new alliances than in gaining access to several major economies in one forum, where it can pursue bilateral cooperation on energy, trade, and investment while seeking collective diplomatic opposition to U.S. sanctions.

Cuba Inaugurates Chinese-supported El Algarrobo Solar Park in Guantánamo

Cuba inaugurated the 21.875-megawatt El Algarrobo solar park in Guantánamo on September 8. The facility is the 37th of 46 solar parks planned under Project B, a Cuba-China cooperation program intended to add approximately 1,000 megawatts of generation capacity to the national grid. It is also the first Project B facility connected to the grid entirely by Cuban specialists, who assumed responsibility after Chinese technicians left the project. However, the park lacks battery storage and cannot supply electricity after sunset.

China has become increasingly important to Cuba’s renewable-energy expansion as the de facto U.S. oil blockade restricts fuel supplies to the island. Cuba’s imports of Chinese solar panels increased thirty-four-fold in one year, while some households and businesses have installed private systems to operate during prolonged blackouts. Cubans are also adding solar panels to electric tricycles used to transport passengers and goods amid fuel and electricity shortages. These adaptations have provided limited alternatives to oil, but high costs and inadequate battery storage constrain their accessibility and ability to address Cuba’s broader energy crisis.

Recommended Reading, Listening & Viewing:

Read | The Guardian: Trump and Rubio allies are vying for control of Cuba’s assets if regime falls

Read | Associated Press: A man fights for a new life in Cuba after the US expels him in an immigration crackdown

Read | The Nation: Cuba: The “Pandora’s Box” of US Humanitarian Assistance

Vista | El Pais: Hogares a oscuras y coches eléctricos: postales de la desigualdad en Cuba

Listen | NPR: Is Cuba Trump's next real estate project? : Code Switch

Read | The American Prospect: ‘Shoot Him!’: Police Threaten Third-Country Nationals Imprisoned in African Hotel

Read | The New York Times: They Fled Cuba for Better Lives. They Were Cut Short by a Cargo Plane

Read | CNN: Cubans are coming up with creative ways to generate power when their island has almost none left

Leer | El País: Elaine Vilar Madruga, escritora: “A veces en Cuba me he sentido encerrada y a veces siento que la isla es mi expansión al mundo”

Leer | CNN: ¿Por qué falló la planta nuclear de Cuba? La historia detrás de la crisis actual

Read | Miami Herald: Freed artist accepts democracy award on behalf of imprisoned dissidents in Cuba