As Cuba’s Oil Runs Out, U.S. Escalates Economic Pressure

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It's been yet another blockbuster week in US-Cuba relations. The Trump administration has moved toward a new phase of economic pressure on the island by declaring a national emergency and enacting tariffs on countries that materially support Cuba, as well as intensifying pressure on regional partners to cut economic ties. These developments come as Cuba is already grappling with the loss of Venezuelan oil, long a critical lifeline for an economy strained by chronic fuel shortages and daily blackouts.

The effects are beginning to hit the island. The Financial Times reported that Cuba only has enough oil to last just 15 to 20 days. Venezuela previously covered roughly half of Cuba’s net oil deficit, leaving Mexico and Russia as the island’s remaining major suppliers. That cushion narrowed further this month when Mexico canceled its January oil shipment amid mounting U.S. pressure, underscoring the vulnerability of Cuba’s energy supply at a moment of acute economic fragility.

These converging pressures raise urgent questions about what comes next. Will Cuba’s remaining allies move to offset the deficit, or will they limit support to symbolic gestures? Is the US prepared to escalate further, and if so, toward what end? And what outcome is President Trump seeking that would allow his administration to declare success and end its tariff regime?

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On January 29, President Trump signed an executive order declaring a national emergency and authorizing the imposition of tariffs on goods from countries that sell or otherwise provide oil to Cuba. The order marks a significant escalation in U.S. economic pressure, effectively targeting third countries that sustain Cuba’s energy supply. The administration justified the move by citing Cuba’s support for “hostile countries” and actions that purportedly threaten U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. If implemented broadly, the measure would further constrain Cuba’s access to fuel and foreign exchange, with severe implications for an economy already in crisis—consequences that would be borne not by the Cuban state alone, but by ordinary Cubans who are already suffering from daily blackouts and resource shortages.

While the executive order lacks operational clarity, the Trump administration has made its goal of regime change unmistakably clear and this move is the economic means of doing so. Its deliberate vagueness grants the administration, and the President in particular, broad discretion in defining both the means and the benchmarks of success.

The order does, however, include a provision allowing for modification should Cuba or affected foreign governments “align sufficiently with the United States on national security and foreign policy matters,” suggesting that economic pressure could theoretically be eased if concessions meet the administration’s undefined standards. This structural ambiguity effectively gives the President control over the narrative of what constitutes acceptable change on the island.

This escalation came after Mexico’s state oil company, PEMEX, canceled its January oil shipment to Cuba. While President Claudia Sheinbaum characterized the move as a “sovereign decision,” the reversal followed sustained pressure from Washington, including public warnings from U.S. lawmakers and heightened scrutiny during the ongoing review of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), a lifeline for Mexico’s economy.

President Sheinbaum has defended the shipments explaining they are consistent with historical levels and humanitarian assistance, and adding that oil shipments and humanitarian aid to Cuba will continue. However, in light of President Trump’s executive order, it remains unclear whether this position can be sustained.

Mexico’s withdrawal further narrowed Cuba’s already limited energy options. While Venezuela's interim President Delcy Rodríguez and President Miguel Díaz-Canel spoke on the phone and reaffirmed their alliance, Venezuela, which historically covered roughly 50 percent of Cuba’s net oil deficit, has sharply reduced supplies, leaving Mexico and Russia as the island’s primary remaining sources of external fuel. Russia has not sent an oil shipment since October. While much of the oil from Venezuela was sold at discounted prices and partially re-exported to generate hard currency, it nonetheless underpinned the broader economy, making the island’s energy outlook increasingly dire.

Against this backdrop, POLITICO reported on January 23 that the Trump administration is considering a full naval blockade of Cuba. Such a move would represent a dramatic escalation beyond economic sanctions, effectively severing the island’s remaining supply lines at a moment of acute vulnerability. According to the Financial Times, Cuba now has enough oil to last only 15 to 20 days, raising the prospect of a rapid and systemic breakdown in electricity generation, transportation, food production, and essential services.

These constraints are no longer abstract, they are already impacting daily life across the island. Cubans are waiting in long lines for gasoline, experiencing power outages exceeding 24 hours in some regions, and rolling blackouts have reached Havana. Economic distress is also manifesting socially, with localized protests reported across several municipalities. These include pot-banging demonstrations, small street gatherings, and anti-government graffiti and poster campaigns. While still fragmented, these actions reflect a growing sense of frustration and exhaustion, and mounting pressure on an already strained social contract. As CNN’s Havana bureau chief Patrick Oppmann observed, “To be in Cuba at the moment is to witness an already beleaguered economy grind to a halt in real time.” 

Senior U.S. officials have framed these developments as evidence that political change may be approaching. President Trump told reporters on January 27 that “Cuba will be falling pretty soon,” while Secretary of State Marco Rubio later clarified in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that although the administration would welcome regime change, it does not intend to directly engineer it. Lawmakers from South Florida have nonetheless urged the White House to pursue additional hardline measures, including ending remittances and flights to the island. Representative Mario Díaz-Balart (FL-26) even suggested that an indictment of Raúl Castro will be next.

Meanwhile, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Cuba, Mike Hammer, reportedly told embassy staff, “If you don’t have your bag packed yet, then pack your bag...now there is going to be a real blockade…Nothing is getting in. No more oil is coming.” Roughly a dozen European and Latin American countries, as well as international businesses, are reviewing their evacuation plans in case of military action on the island.

Cuba’s government has denounced the new tariffs, calling them a “genocidal policy.” Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, wrote on X this is the “most cruel blockade ever imposed against an entire nation and which it now has committed to subject to extreme living conditions.”

In recent years, despite the depth of the humanitarian crisis on the island, the Cuban government has offered few sustained public assessments that acknowledge the full scale of social and economic distress or clearly articulate a credible path forward. Beyond general rhetoric, there has been limited engagement with the government’s role in shaping the crisis or with concrete policy measures to alleviate its human consequences.

Some recent actions suggest a degree of internal discipline rather than public acknowledgment. The dismissal of the Minister of Labor and Social Security following comments denying the existence of poverty, which stood out as a rare sign of the acknowledgement of the struggles of Cuban people, and the Supreme Court’s recent decision to uphold a life sentence against former Deputy Prime Minister Alejandro Gil on corruption and espionage charges, signal efforts to consolidate control amid mounting pressure.

At the same time, Cuba’s government has continued to roll out technocratic initiatives, such as a new National Financial Education Strategy, that experts like Cuban economist Pedro Monreal, argue further burden an already ineffective central bank. Beyond heightened rhetoric, Cuba has undertaken military drills overseen by President Miguel Díaz-Canel, framed as preparation for a “pre-war state,” which appear largely symbolic.

A range of influential independent and international outlets that cover Cuba—including OnCuba News, CiberCuba, El País, elTOQUE, and voices associated with the Cuban diaspora such as the Cuba Study Group—have published commentary and statements, reflecting growing concern about Cuba’s political and economic trajectory. Recently, non-profit organization La Joven Cuba released a video featuring Cuban experts, many of whom still live on the island, urging the government to undertake fundamental socioeconomic restructuring while it still can. While these perspectives vary, many underscore the urgency of institutional reform, warn of deepening isolation, and highlight the risks of continued disengagement between Havana and Washington.

Regional governments are increasingly concerned about the spillover effects of Cuba’s deepening crisis. Officials in the Cayman Islands have stated they are preparing for a potential surge in Cuban migrants, while reports suggest Mexican authorities remain wary that a complete cutoff of oil supplies could accelerate migration flows northward. According to UNHCR, asylum applications by Cubans in Mexico reached 38,598 over the course of 2025, making Mexico the third most popular country for Cubans behind the US and Brazil.

Despite the escalation, fundamental questions remain about Washington’s strategic endgame. As Ricardo Zúñiga, former Obama administration adviser and a key negotiator during the U.S.–Cuba rapprochement, recently underscored, “Cuba is not Venezuela.” In contrast to Venezuela, Zúñiga noted, Cuba lacks the internal fractures that external pressure could easily exploit: “There is no equivalent to a Delcy Rodríguez, no meaningful fragmentation of power, and no indication that anyone within the current leadership is prepared to break with the party.” Nevertheless, the Wall Street Journal has reported that U.S. officials are seeking regime change in Cuba before the end of 2026, betting that compounded economic crises will precipitate political collapse despite CIA assessments to the contrary.

Cuba’s remaining allies have so far offered limited relief. Russia has issued statements of solidarity and held high-level meetings, but has made no new policy commitments. Given heightened U.S. naval patrols in the Caribbean, additional Russian deliveries would face significant obstacles. China has provided more tangible assistance, pledging $80 million in emergency aid for electrical equipment and 60,000 tons of rice. Still, as Associate Professor of History and Chair in Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, Michael Bustamante has argued, so far, neither Beijing nor Moscow appears willing to underwrite an economic model they view as fundamentally unsustainable. External support, for now, remains insufficient to offset the scale of Cuba’s unfolding energy and economic crisis.

This week in Cuba news…

U.S. Executive Order Targets Oil Trade with Cuba

On January 29, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order that would impose tariffs on any goods from any country that sells or provides oil to Cuba. According to a report by POLITICO, the Trump administration had been considering imposing a total blockade on oil imports to Cuba, citing three anonymous officials familiar with the plan. By attempting an oil blockade through tariffs, the administration pressures sovereign nations to reassess their economic and diplomatic relationship with Havana. A complete end to oil shipments to Cuba would likely trigger a humanitarian crisis on the island and force Cuba’s government to reckon with the damages.

Following the ousting of Nicolás Maduro, President Trump announced a halt to Venezuelan oil shipments to Cuba, a move that aligns with his broader effort to exert control over oil movements in and out of Venezuela. On January 20, the U.S. military announced the seizure of a Venezuela-linked oil tanker, marking one of seven such interceptions. In response, Cuba’s Ambassador to Colombia, Carlos de Céspedes, accused the US of “international piracy,” describing the measures as the imposition of a “marine siege” on Cuba.

As a result, Cuba has turned to Africa for fuel supplies after losing Venezuela as an important oil provider and facing declines in shipments from Russia and Mexico. Satellite tracking data shows that the petrochemical tanker Mia Grace departed the port of Lomé, Togo, on January 19. The vessel is believed to carry an estimated 314,500 barrels of diesel or approximately 280,000 barrels of fuel oil. Jorge Piñon, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute, told Diario de Cuba that “the exact type of fuel has not been confirmed.” 

Although the tanker was originally scheduled to arrive in Havana on February 4, it has since altered its course and is no longer headed to Cuba. Instead, the vessel is now en route to the port of Río Haina in the Dominican Republic, where it is expected to arrive on February 2. No official explanation has been provided for the change in destination.

Mexico Signals Solidarity With Cuba Following Reports of Oil Shipment Cancellations

On January 28, Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum reaffirmed Mexico’s solidarity with Cuba, despite the cancellation of a crude oil shipment from Petroleros Mexicanos (PEMEX) that had been scheduled for January. The shipment was removed from the company’s official schedule without a clear public explanation. President Sheinbaum explained that PEMEX determines whether oil is sent to Cuba under contracts with institutions on the island. She also clarified that Mexico delivers crude oil in two ways: humanitarian aid and contract shipments. The decision to halt the shipment in January was a contract decision. She clarified that humanitarian aid to Cuba, like aid to other countries, will continue.

Following the ousting of Nicolás Maduro, Mexico emerged as Cuba’s key supplier of petroleum. A Reuters report citing three senior Mexican government sources familiar with the discussions notes that Mexico is now reviewing the policy amid concerns that continued exports could provoke retaliation from Washington.

The same three official sources also pointed to growing concern over increased U.S. Navy drone activity in the Gulf of Mexico and the Bay of Campeche. Flight-tracking data indicates that at least three drones have conducted multiple flights closely following the maritime routes used to transport oil from Mexico to Cuba. Mexican officials remain concerned that halting oil to Cuba would cause an influx of migration to Mexico whilst other officials are concerned whether being at odds with the US is worth the risk.

According to information reported by PEMEX, an average of 17,200 barrels of crude oil per day and 2,000 barrels per day of refined petroleum products were delivered to Cuba between January and September 2025, totaling roughly $400 million. Previously, President Sheinbaum has publicly defended the shipments of crude oil to Cuba as humanitarian aid, stressing that they have continued at historically consistent levels.

Autopsy Finds Cuban Detainee Died of Asphyxia at Texas ICE Facility

On January 3, the El Paso County Medical Examiner’s Office ruled the death of 55-year-old Cuban detainee Gerardo Lunas Campos a homicide. Deputy Medical Examiner Dr. Adam Gonzales concluded that asphyxia caused by compression of the neck and torso led to his death. The report documented signs of a struggle, including abrasions on his chest and knees, as well as hemorrhages in his neck. Lunas Campos is one of three detainees to have died in the Camp East Montana detention facility, 44 days after its opening. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initially addressed Lunas Campos’s death in a statement released on January 9, claiming that he “became disruptive while in line for medication and refused to return to his assigned dorm.” He was subsequently placed in isolation, where staff later observed him in distress and contacted on-site medical personnel. He was pronounced dead after paramedics arrived. After suspicions emerged that the death may have been a homicide, DHS amended its account. 

The administration’s account of the homicide greatly differs from what was observed by others in the detention center. Fellow detainee Santos Jesus Flores spoke with The Washington Post and claimed he saw guards choking Lunas Campos and heard him say “No puedo respirar,” Spanish for “I can’t breathe.” According to Flores, an attempt to resuscitate him was made for an hour to no success. The Trump administration has actively taken steps to deport Flores and another detainee who provided eyewitness testimony. 

Judge Halts Termination of Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program

On January 25, Judge Indira Talwani of the Boston District Court issued a preliminary injunction blocking the Trump administration’s effort to end the legal status of more than 8,400 individuals under family reunification parole programs, including the Cuban Family Reunification Parole (CFRP) program. The DHS initially announced the policy change on December 12. Prior to this pause, individuals utilizing these programs would lose their legal status on January 14 unless they had already applied for permanent residency or adjustment of status before December 15, 2025.

Initially, Judge Talwani issued a temporary order freezing the policy for two weeks while she assessed whether a broader injunction was necessary. After further review, she concluded that the DHS had not sufficiently justified the policy change, citing a lack of evidence to support its allegations of fraud. The broader injunction has no set expiration date and will remain in effect until the court reaches a final decision or a higher court lifts the order.

Two Cuban Men Ordered Deported to Ecuador
Local media in upstate New York report that Alcibiades “Alex” Lázaro Ramírez González and his partner, Yannier “Yan” Vázquez Hidalgo, both Cuban nationals, have been ordered deported to Ecuador despite having no ties to the country. González was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the fall during a routine check-in appointment, while Hidalgo now faces an imminent deadline of February 22 to file an appeal.

The deportation orders follow a third-country removal agreement signed between the US and Ecuador in November 2025, under which Ecuador agreed to accept deportees from countries other than its own. Both men had applied for asylum in the US, citing fears of persecution in Cuba due to their sexual orientation, but their claims were denied, and they were ineligible to receive status through the Cuban Adjustment Act, according to their lawyers.

Both men were employed at Upstate University Hospital, where their case has prompted a strong local response. The Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) SUNY Upstate Local 615 issued a public statement expressing solidarity with the men, as community members and colleagues continue to advocate on their behalf.

Miami-Dade County Moves to Suspend All Cuba Related-Federal Licenses

In an escalation of a dispute that has been building for months, Miami-Dade County commissioners voted unanimously to move toward suspending all Cuba-related federal general licenses, arguing that they pose a “clear national security threat” by enabling material support to Cuba’s government.

The licenses in question, known as Support for the Cuban People licenses, permit certain U.S. exporters to send goods intended for Cuba’s private sector, as well as items sold directly to individuals for personal or family use. These licenses are designed to strengthen civil society and encourage independent economic activity outside the state-controlled sector. County officials, including Tax Collector Dariel Fernández, have claimed that some license holders have abused these authorizations, though specific findings have not been made public.

Critics warn that suspending these licenses would have unintended humanitarian consequences. As Cuba Study Group Executive Director Ricardo Herrero notes, “The administration says it wants to prioritize humanitarian aid through the Church. But even the Church depends on the same web of private importers, distributors, and service providers that these licenses sustain.” Cutting off these channels, he argues, would further constrict access to food, medicine, and basic goods for ordinary Cubans rather than weakening the state.

Conservative social media figure Alexander Otaola and political opponent of Miami-Dade County Mayor Daniella Levine Cava publicly celebrated the decision made by Miami-Dade county to revoke all Cuba-related federal licenses. The move by Miami-Dade fits within a broader pattern of tightening constraints on Cuba, adding another layer of pressure that risks exacerbating the island’s already severe humanitarian and economic crisis. The commission’s move comes amid heightened political tension.

Recommended Reading, Listening & Viewing:

Read | New York Times: The Journey of a Group of Cuban Deportees Stuck at Guantánamo

Read | Miami Herald: For decades many have predicted the downfall of Cuba’s regime. Is this time different?

Read | The Guardian: ‘History will tell’: as US pressure grows, Cuba edges closer to collapse amid mass exodus

Read | The Lever: The Supreme Court’s Quiet War On Cuba

Read | Associated Press: Cuba’s Santeros offer gifts and ask deities for peace as tensions rise with US

Read | El País: From the Bay of Pigs to the capture of Maduro: Over half a century of waiting for the fall of Castroism 

Read | New York Times: Can Cuba Survive Without Venezuela’s Oil? 

Read | 14ymedio (Spanish): El Tribunal Supremo ratifica la condena perpetua al ex viceprimer ministro Alejandro Gil

Read | AULA Blog: Magical Thinking Won’t Produce Cuba’s Final Hour