What the U.S. Operation That Ousted Maduro Means for Cuba’s Future: An Interview with Ricardo Torres, Emily Mendrala, and Jorge Piñon
Background
On January 3, the Trump administration carried out a surprise operation in Venezuela that led to the capture and extraction of Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. The operation marked an unprecedented escalation whose shock waves continue to ripple across the region and mark it for years to come.
While the operation was directly against Caracas, its consequences immediately entangled Cuba in the altercation. Havana reported that 32 Cuban nationals serving as security personnel inside Venezuela’s presidential palace were killed during the strike. In response, Cuban authorities declared two days of national mourning and condemned the operation as “state terrorism.” President Trump has declared that Cuba is “ready to fall” and that it is “going down for the count.
This unprecedented attack has huge implications for Cuba. The country remains heavily dependent on Venezuelan crude to offset its persistent fuel deficit. On the island, the mood has been one of shock and anxiety. Many Cubans fear that Venezuelan assistance may now disappear altogether.
The relationship between Venezuela and Cuba is a long and storied one, rooted in the October 2000 Cuba–Venezuela Cooperation Agreement under which Venezuela supplied oil in exchange for Cuban services, including doctors, teachers, and security personnel. That framework remains central to Cuba’s energy lifeline today.
Against the backdrop of heightened rhetoric and uncertainty, CEDA spoke with three experts to assess what this moment means for Cuba’s future.
Ricardo Torres is a research fellow and adjunct professor at American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies. He is a leading scholar on Cuba’s economy and holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Havana. His work focuses on economic development and system reform in Cuba and Latin America.
Emily Mendrala is a former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor on Migration at the White House. She previously held leadership roles at the State Department, National Security Council, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Jorge Piñon is a senior research fellow at the University of Texas at Austin’s Energy Institute. He has testified before the U.S. Congress on regional energy issues and is the coauthor of several books on Cuba’s energy and political economy.
*The opinions and points of view expressed by interviewees are their own and don’t necessarily reflect the opinions or positions of CEDA.
*Quotes from the interview with Jorge Piñon have been lightly edited for clarity and concision.
CEDA: At this inflection point, what real options does Cuba have? Given a regional landscape that has been completely reshaped by developments in Venezuela, the U.S.’ return to the Monroe Doctrine, and Cuba’s own internal constraints, what paths forward are realistically available to Havana over the next 12–24 months?
Ricardo Torres: U.S. government statements indicate a clear intention to increase pressure on Cuba. At the same time, given the island’s already fragile conditions—and the preference for stability suggested by recent developments in Venezuela—there remains a plausible scenario in which limited volumes of oil are still allowed to reach Cuba.
The key near-term variable is whether external energy leverage tightens further. Reporting from early January 2026 suggests that the United States is explicitly linking Venezuela’s oil disposition to a U.S.-managed transition plan and signaling downstream consequences for Cuba. If that channel hardens, Cuba’s policy space will narrow significantly, increasing the temptation to retreat into a “fortress” model centered on crisis management and administrative controls. If it loosens, or is partially backfilled, the government may gain limited room to pursue economic reforms without immediate political opening and to test whether more predictable rules can begin restoring hard- currency inflows.
What does appear very likely, in any scenario, is to seek whatever temporary relief traditional allies may still be willing and able to provide—while recognizing that such relief cannot substitute for deeper domestic reform.
Emily Mendrala: The world has fundamentally changed in just twelve months—not solely due to actions by the Trump administration. We’re witnessing a global reordering that will define a new chapter in international relations. But the U.S. foreign policy of today, including the reprisal of the Monroe Doctrine and U.S. attempts to dominate Latin America by force, will not be the U.S. policy of the future. U.S. policy will again change, but not, unfortunately, before it breeds distrust and resentment and undermines U.S. influence in Latin America and around the world.
Irrespective of this global reordering, Cuba is in a bind. Its economy is in distress, as are its citizens. The Cuban people want the opportunity to succeed. To thrive. Steps like opening up the private sector, allowing journalists to report freely, and releasing political prisoners are important steps toward empowering the people.
CEDA: Following the U.S. operation in Venezuela, Cuba publicly condemned Maduro’s capture as “state terrorism.” How should we interpret Havana’s reaction? What do these signals suggest about Cuba’s likely policy or security posture going forward?
Emily Mendrala: The whole region is on edge now. The U.S. just took out Nicolás Maduro in a military operation under the cover of night, under questionable legal authority and motivated by oil revenues. President Trump seems to have his sights set on Greenland next. All of the old rulebooks have been thrown out the window. Foreign leaders – regardless of their ideological or party identities, and far beyond the named next target countries (Colombia and Cuba) – are understandably concerned.
CEDA: Secretary of State Marco Rubio has warned Cuba’s leaders to be “concerned” and has emphasized Cuba’s involvement in Venezuela’s internal security apparatus. In light of the confirmed Cuban casualties and this rhetoric, how credible is the prospect of heightened U.S. pressure or action toward Cuba? How does this moment compare to the Biden–Harris administration’s approach, or even the first Trump administration’s posture toward Havana?
Emily Mendrala: Some in the Trump administration would like a more aggressive U.S. posture toward Cuba. Policy leaders on either side of the regime change debate assert that they are working toward a future where the Cuban people can determine their own future. However, like we are seeing play out in days following the Venezuela operation, it’s unclear what if any plan the Trump administration would have for the day after a collapse or regime change scenario, should either come about.
President Obama, on the other hand, sought to empower the Cuban people, to facilitate the free flow of people, goods, and information between the U.S. and Cuba, and to remove U.S. policy obstacles as barriers to the Cuban people’s success.
For his part, President Trump has signaled interest in Cuba but stated the U.S. will not take military action at this time.
CEDA: Does Maduro’s removal increase the likelihood that Cuba doubles down on ties with China and Russia as a hedge, or could it instead deter Havana from more openly challenging U.S. influence in the region?
Emily Mendrala: Cuba will likely seek partnerships in the way it historically has, looking to meet the country’s needs via traditional partners. But with regular, wide-spread power outages, shortages of medical supplies and essential medicines, and growing food insecurity, it’s clear that the Cuban people are struggling.
CEDA: In the days following the U.S. military operation removing Maduro, President Trump stated that Cuba is “ready to fall.” From an economic standpoint, how realistic is that assessment—particularly if the U.S. gains control over Venezuela’s oil production and exports
Ricardo Torres: Cuba’s economic outlook is exceptionally adverse. GDP has contracted by at least 15 percent from its 2018 peak, with downturns in five of the last seven years, including three consecutive declines. The contraction deepened further in 2025. Electricity generation is roughly one quarter below 2019 levels, with fuel shortages accounting for at least 40 percent of that gap; blackouts and energy rationing have become structural rather than episodic. Transportation has largely collapsed in many regions, and basic public services have deteriorated sharply—most notably, infant mortality has doubled over the past five years. In December, the Cuban government itself acknowledged that the country is “partially paralyzed.”
If U.S. control over Venezuelan oil exports results in a sustained cutoff of supplies to Cuba, the short-term macroeconomic effects would be severe, especially through electricity generation, logistics, and aggregate output. Under that scenario, the claim that Cuba is “ready to fall” is plausible as a description of vulnerability to an external shock. Whether the country actually “falls,” however, depends less on oil flows alone than on domestic policy responses and the availability of alternative buffers—such as limited support from Mexico or Russia, emergency imports, demand compression, and diaspora-related inflows.
CEDA: How might Venezuela’s transition—or prolonged instability—interact with Cuba’s fragile economic reforms, especially efforts to attract foreign investment and stabilize hard-currency inflows?
Ricardo Torres: Venezuela’s trajectory matters for Cuba primarily through three channels: energy reliability, investor risk perceptions, and hard-currency generation. Venezuelan oil is not marginal to the Cuban economy; it underpins electricity production, transportation, and basic services. Any disruption—or even persistent uncertainty—immediately worsens blackouts, undermines operational continuity, and weakens tourism and other foreign-exchange-earning activities. A stabilized Venezuela under U.S. influence would not automatically ease Cuba’s constraints. Any continued oil flows would likely be reduced, repriced, or explicitly conditioned, raising compliance risks for banks and investors and keeping country risk elevated. A scenario of prolonged Venezuelan instability would be even more damaging, as erratic supply would reinforce emergency-style policymaking and increase the likelihood of abrupt policy reversals, discouraging long-term investment.
In both cases, the implication for Cuba is similar: external relief is unlikely to be durable. Stabilizing hard-currency inflows therefore requires making economic reforms credibly irreversible—through clearer rules, greater policy predictability, and a more professional state apparatus—rather than relying on yet another external patron.
CEDA: Do you see this moment accelerating economic reform in Cuba out of necessity, or constraining it further due to increased uncertainty and isolation?
Ricardo Torres: Cuba is confronting a near perfect storm: deep internal fragilities combined with a more adverse external environment. The Trump administration’s actions are reshaping regional dynamics, and it remains unclear how this will affect the priorities of Cuba’s remaining allies, including Russia and China. Notably, those countries—as well as Vietnam and Belarus—have publicly complained about the slow pace of reform and the obstacles Cuban authorities create for joint ventures. Even within Latin America, support has eroded: two countries voted against Cuba’s annual UN resolution on the embargo, while two others abstained. In Europe, Ukraine, the Netherlands, and Belgium have announced the withdrawal of their embassies.
Against this backdrop, any reform effort would need to be both bold and clearly distinct from previous attempts to alter external perceptions. The reforms of the Special Period are not an adequate reference point today. Moreover, economic reform alone is unlikely to suffice. Issues of political representativeness and institutional legitimacy have become increasingly salient, particularly as difficult economic decisions loom—problems that ultimately require political, not just technocratic, solutions.
In the short term, the current shock is more likely to constrain reform by reinforcing uncertainty and crisis-driven management. Over the medium term, however, a sustained shock could force a pivot—provided the leadership opts for credibility-building reforms rather than doubling down on administrative controls.
CEDA: Can you walk us through the historical origins of the oil relationship between Cuba and Venezuela and how it has evolved over time?
Jorge Piñon: Venezuela, or the new government of Venezuela, quote-unquote, is going to continue supplying Cuba with oil under a barter agreement. We've got to remember that was the October 2000 agreement. The October 2000 agreement, Cuba paid for some of the oil, it didn't pay for the rest, but eventually it became a 100% true barter agreement where Cuba provided Venezuela with oil, not under subsidized prices, but just through a true barter agreement of services, doctors, teachers, military advisors, which of course, 32 of them, we saw them die here in the last 48 hours.
CEDA: How dependent is Cuba on Venezuelan oil today compared to previous decades and what will happen is that supply gets cut off?
Jorge Piñon: Historically, Cuba’s dependence on Venezuela was even deeper. Between 2007 and 2015, PDVSA supplied Havana with as much as 90,000–95,000 barrels per day…Then after 2015 and 2016…that dropped to about 55,000 barrels a day. And then in the last years, that of course continued to diminish because Venezuela didn't have oil.
The loss of Venezuelan oil, whether it's 30 or 50 [thousand barrels], if that gets cut off, it would be catastrophic. Not only from an economic point of view, but psychologically.
Most of the protests in the streets have been because of the water or the lack of LPG. We follow LPG because we think that it not only has an economic impact but also has a social impact. People are willing to run in the street and yell and scream and do whatever they do because there is no LPG.
CEDA: What viable alternatives does Cuba have to replace the oil it currently receives from Venezuela?
Piñon identified Angola, Algeria, Brazil, and Colombia as potential suppliers—but emphasized that U.S. pressure makes any such arrangement politically risky.
Jorge Piñon: Anybody that comes out of the woodwork to help Cuba, I think the U.S. will react negatively.
