Special Edition: Maduro’s Fall and Cuba’s Reckoning

Jan 9

Written By CEDA The Center for Engagement and Advocacy in the Americas

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*This special edition draws on exclusive interviews conducted by CEDA to examine the strategic, humanitarian, and regional implications of U.S. action in Venezuela for Cuba and the wider hemisphere. See interviews and analysis below.

Cuba has returned to the center of U.S. political discourse this week. President Trump declared that Cuba is “ready to fall” and that it is “going down for the count,” while signaling that Havana is “going to be something we’ll end up talking about” in the wake of U.S. action in Venezuela. In an interview with Fox News on January 9, President Trump said, “We want to do something to help Cuba” after host Sean Hannity suggested this was part of “Marco’s revenge.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio echoed Hannity’s tone, remarking that if he were in the Cuban government, he would be “concerned at least a little bit.”

These comments came after Washington carried out a unilateral military intervention in Venezuela. On January 3, the Trump administration launched a surprise operation that resulted in the capture and extraction of Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores—an unprecedented escalation whose shock waves are still unfolding across the region and will have reverberations for years to come. CEDA released a press statement detailing the humanitarian implications of this event, explaining, “These developments unfold at a moment when the US has frozen, canceled, or suspended nearly all of its humanitarian assistance to Venezuela and much of the region.” Roughly 600,000 Venezuelans in the US are facing deportation due to policies of the Trump administration.

In the immediate aftermath, Venezuela’s Supreme Court and senior military leadership moved swiftly to install Vice President Delcy Rodríguez as interim president, after which she was formally sworn in as President, consolidating control within the existing state apparatus. Notably absent from this process was María Corina Machado and the opposition movement that had mobilized millions of Venezuelans in recent years and won the public’s mandate at the ballot box, leaving the country’s post-Maduro transition in the hands of regime insiders.

Meanwhile, President Trump and his administration have grown increasingly explicit in their threats of intervention in Colombia (from which President Trump later backed down), Cuba, Greenland, and Mexico, leaving many experts uncertain about the administration's next moves.

President Trump and Secretary Rubio have constantly contradicted one another on the administration's plan for Venezuela following Maduro’s ousting, leaving the future of the country hanging in balance. President Trump suggested that the US will control Venezuela’s oil reserves for “much longer” than a year, telling The New York Times that Washington would “rebuild it in a very profitable way.” Secretary Rubio, by contrast, has briefed lawmakers on a three‑phase plan of the U.S. intervention that begins with “stabilization” by shoring up Delcy Rodríguez’s interim government’s control, followed by “recovery” and ultimately a “transition,” leaving the ultimate contours of U.S. strategy opaque.

President Trump outlined conditions under which Venezuela would be allowed to increase oil production and exports, including a requirement that any future Venezuelan government sever ties with U.S. adversaries such as China, Iran, Russia, and Cuba.

Although the operation targeted Caracas, Cuba was immediately and deeply entangled in its fallout. Havana announced that 32 Cuban nationals serving as security personnel inside Venezuela’s presidential palace were killed during the strikes. Cuba has long-denied that it supplies security forces to Venezuela. Cuban officials declared two days of national mourning and condemned the operation as “state terrorism.”

The relationship between Venezuela and Cuba is a long and storied one, rooted in the October 2000 Cuba–Venezuela Cooperation Agreement under which Venezuela supplied oil in exchange for Cuban services, including doctors, teachers, and security personnel. That framework remains central to Cuba’s energy lifeline today. In fact, just weeks before his capture, Maduro had announced at the 25th ALBA‑TCP Virtual Summit that several Caribbean countries approved an International Energy and Electricity Mission to help restore Cuba’s failing electrical system. Whether that initiative will proceed is now uncertain.

For Secretary Rubio, Maduro’s fall represents the culmination of a decades‑long political project. The son of Cuban immigrants, Rubio has consistently advocated cutting off support for both the Venezuelan and Cuban governments, advocating sanctions and punitive pressure over engagement with these countries. As a U.S. senator representing Florida, a state with significant Cuban and Venezuelan diaspora communities, he consistently pushed for tougher measures on Caracas and Havana, shaping U.S. policy toward both governments over more than a decade.

The moment has also been celebrated by lawmakers from South Florida, who held a joint press conference on January 3, hailing Maduro’s capture and encouraging the Trump administration to target Cuba next. Representative María Elvira Salazar (FL-27) wrote on X: “With Maduro gone, the Cuban regime is next to feel the pressure…Their time is running out.”

The reaction beyond Washington and Miami has been far more critical.

Across the region: Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro condemned the operation in unusually blunt terms, calling it an “aberrant” violation of sovereignty, after which Trump threatened to invade Colombia. Later, the two leaders reported a cordial call. President Petro, alongside Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, called an emergency meeting of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) on January 4, which ended without unanimous consensus on how to respond, though several member states released a statement expressing concern over U.S. action in the region.

Mexico denounced the strike as a violation of the UN Charter. President Lula da Silva warned that it threatened the region’s status as a “zone of peace,” while Chile and Spain urged de‑escalation. Cuba’s President Miguel Díaz‑Canel accused the US of “state terrorism” and of launching a “criminal attack” on Venezuela, calling for an urgent international response.

Throughout the world: China responded stating, “Such hegemonic acts of the U.S. seriously violate international law and Venezuela’s sovereignty.” Russia was greatly angered by the operation, which was only furthered when the US seized an oil tanker in the North Atlantic flying the Russian flag in the days following.

In Washington: the Senate joined the choir of disapproval in a rare rebuke of the President by passing a resolution seeking to block the use of U.S. armed forces within or against Venezuela unless authorized by Congress. Five Republicans joined Democrats to allow its passage, prompting President Trump to post on Truth Social that they should “never be elected to office again.” The vote was a largely symbolic measure as this resolution has little chance of passing in the Republican-controlled House; if it does, it would still have to be signed by the President.

On the island, the mood has been one of shock and anxiety. Many Cubans fear that Venezuelan assistance may now disappear altogether. Cuban authorities organized a protest outside the U.S. Embassy in Havana the morning of the operation, where Díaz‑Canel delivered a fiery address condemning U.S. actions.

Against this backdrop, U.S. naval movements have also drawn attention. Following Maduro’s capture, the US reduced its naval presence in the Caribbean, shifting the USS Iwo Jima and USS San Antonio north of Cuba into the Atlantic, with officials indicating that at least one vessel may soon return to the US. Maduro himself was transferred through the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay before being flown to New York—a symbolic stop that did not go unnoticed in Havana.

A key question revolves around Cuba’s reliance on Venezuela for oil. Cuba remains heavily dependent on Venezuelan crude to offset its persistent fuel deficit. On December 16, before Maduro’s capture, President Trump announced a “complete blockade” on sanctioned Venezuelan oil tankers, at least 16 of which were located in Venezuelan ports before the blockade and have since turned off their transmission signals.

To help unpack this potentially catastrophic moment for Cuba, CEDA spoke with experts Jorge Piñon, Emily Mendrala, and Ricardo Torres.

Jorge Piñon, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Texas at Austin’s Energy Institute, gave CEDA an exclusive interview to help us understand how the loss of Venezuelan oil will impact Cuba.

Piñon first explained the breakdown of Cuba’s total daily fuel demand, which is about 100,000 barrels. Domestic production covers only 40,000 barrels per day—all of it heavy, high-sulfur crude used almost exclusively for electricity generation. That leaves a 60,000-barrel-per-day shortfall. Venezuela currently supplies Cuba with approximately 30,000-35,000 barrels per day, accounting for roughly 50 percent of Cuba’s net oil deficit, based on data from the Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas de Cuba (ONEI).

The remainder comes from a mix of Mexican exports (approximately 22,000 barrels per day in 2024 and early 2025), limited Russian shipments, and spot-market purchases—primarily diesel and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).

Days before the operation, Mexico confirmed it had sent two ships carrying 80,000 barrels of petroleum to Cuba as humanitarian aid, underscoring Mexico’s important role as a fuel supplier as Venezuelan deliveries falter. However, Mexico has not sent oil to Cuba since Maduro was ousted, but reportedly plans to continue at usual levels.

The loss of Venezuelan oil, Piñon warned, would be catastrophic. “If that gets cut off, the impact in Cuba is going to be catastrophic—not only from an economic point of view, but psychologically.”

As CEDA has covered in previous briefings, fuel shortages underpin Cuba’s constant blackouts. The island has faced five nationwide blackouts in the past year, including a major outage on December 3 that left millions without power in western Cuba and parts of Havana. With electricity unreliable, LPG has become essential for daily survival.

As Piñon critically points out, “most of the protests in the streets have been because of the water or the lack of LPG. We follow LPG because we think that it not only has an economic impact but also has a social impact. People are willing to run in the street and yell and scream and do whatever they do because there is no LPG.”

Piñon also helps us put this into context, “Historically, Cuba’s dependence on Venezuela was even deeper. Between 2007 and 2015, PDVSA supplied Havana with as much as 90,000–95,000 barrels per day…Then after 2015 and 2016…that dropped to about 55,000 barrels a day. And then in the last years, that of course continued to diminish because Venezuela didn't have oil.”

Today, alternatives for Cuba are scarce. Piñon identified Angola, Algeria, Brazil, and Colombia as potential suppliers—but emphasized that U.S. pressure makes any such arrangement politically risky. “Anybody that comes out of the woodwork to help Cuba, I think the U.S. will react negatively,” he warned.

The result is a grim outlook. Without Venezuelan oil or a negotiated accommodation involving Washington, Cuba faces deepening shortages, heightened social unrest, and a fragile energy system pushed closer to collapse.

All of this leads to the central question confronting policymakers and analysts alike: What does Maduro’s removal—and President Trump’s declaration that the U.S. will control Venezuela’s oil for years—mean for Cuba?

CEDA: Over the next 12–24 months, what real options does Cuba have?

Emily Mendrala, former deputy assistant to the President, senior advisor on migration, and coordinator for the southwest border at the White House from 2023 to 2024: The world has fundamentally changed in just twelve months—not solely due to actions by the Trump administration. We’re witnessing a global reordering that will define a new chapter in international relations. But the U.S. foreign policy of today, including the reprisal of the Monroe Doctrine and U.S. attempts to dominate Latin America by force, will not be the U.S. policy of the future. U.S. policy will again change, but not, unfortunately, before it breeds distrust and resentment and undermines U.S. influence in Latin America and around the world.

Irrespective of this global reordering, Cuba is in a bind. Its economy is in distress, as are its citizens. The Cuban people want the opportunity to succeed. To thrive. Steps like opening up the private sector, allowing journalists to report freely, and releasing political prisoners are important steps toward empowering the people.

Ricardo Torres, Cuban economist and research fellow and adjunct professor at American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies: U.S. government statements indicate a clear intention to increase pressure on Cuba. At the same time, given the island’s already fragile conditions—and the preference for stability suggested by recent developments in Venezuela—there remains a plausible scenario in which limited volumes of oil are still allowed to reach Cuba.

The key near-term variable is whether external energy leverage tightens further. Reporting from early January 2026 suggests that the United States is explicitly linking Venezuela’s oil disposition to a U.S.-managed transition plan and signaling downstream consequences for Cuba. If that channel hardens, Cuba’s policy space will narrow significantly, increasing the temptation to retreat into a “fortress” model centered on crisis management and administrative controls. If it loosens, or is partially backfilled, the government may gain limited room to pursue economic reforms without immediate political opening and to test whether more predictable rules can begin restoring hard- currency inflows.

What does appear very likely, in any scenario, is to seek whatever temporary relief traditional allies may still be willing and able to provide—while recognizing that such relief cannot substitute for deeper domestic reform.

We also spoke to Ricardo and Emily about how Cuba’s government will react to this seismic shift in hemispheric relations, how this moment can be placed in history, and if Cuba and its economy is truly “ready to fall” as President Trump has claimed. You can read their full interviews here.

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This week in Cuba news…

32 Cuban Officers Killed in U.S. Strikes on Venezuela

In an official statement, Cuba’s government reported that U.S. military strikes on Venezuela on January 3 killed 32 Cuban officers. U.S. officials reported that in total, 75 individuals died in the military operation, contrasting with Venezuela’s Interior Minister, Diosdado Cabello, who said that 100 people died.

Eleven of the men killed were members of Cuba’s armed forces and 21 served in its interior ministry. President Díaz-Canel said the officers were carrying out an official mission on behalf of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Ministry of the Interior at the request of Venezuela’s government. President Trump confirmed that no U.S. soldiers were killed.

To honor the deceased officers, Díaz-Canel declared a period of national mourning that began at 6 a.m. on January 5 and ended at midnight on January 6. On January 6, Cuba’s government published the identities of the 32 officers on its official Facebook account. The officers’ ages varied widely, ranging from 26-year-old Lieutenant Fernando Antonio Báez Hidalgo to 67-year-old Colonel Humberto Alfonso Roca Sánchez.

As long-standing allies, Cuba and Venezuela have maintained an exchange in which Cuba has sent thousands of its citizens, primarily doctors and teachers, as well as intelligence agents and security personnel, to Venezuela in return for oil. In December, The New York Times reported that amid increased U.S. military pressure and presence around Venezuela, President Maduro expanded his security forces, including by placing more Cuban counterintelligence agents within the Venezuelan military. On January 5, Venezuela’s military honored the deceased Cuban officers by publishing a tribute video on social media featuring images of the individuals.

Mexico Sends 80,000 Barrels of Petroleum to Cuba

On December 23, Mexico's President Claudia Sheinbaum confirmed that Mexico sent two ships carrying 80,000 barrels of petroleum to Cuba to help address the island’s ongoing energy crisis and as humanitarian aid for the people of Cuba. Over the past year, Cuba has experienced five nationwide power outages due to an aging electrical grid and shortages of petroleum. Cuba’s total daily fuel demand is estimated at around 100,000 barrels; however, domestic production supplies roughly only 40,000 barrels a day.

U.S. officials viewed the shipment as a sign of political support for Cuba’s government, further straining relations between Mexico and the US.

During a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere hearing, Representative María Elvira Salazar (FL-27) criticized Mexico’s oil shipments to Cuba, stating, “I sent a clear message to President Sheinbaum: history is watching. Stop enabling dictators in Venezuela and Cuba.” Separately, on October 30, Representative Carlos Giménez (FL-28) sent a letter to the U.S. Department of State arguing that Mexico’s oil shipments to Cuba violate the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). He also contended that the agreement’s 2026 review could provide an opportunity to pressure Mexico to end its energy cooperation with Havana.

Despite the criticism, President Sheinbaum has defended the shipment, emphasizing its humanitarian purpose. She stated that Mexico has maintained relations with Cuba across administrations, regardless of political party, and described the shipment as consistent with that long-standing relationship.

During her weekly press conference on January 6, Sheinbaum confirmed that Mexico has not continued petroleum shipments after the capture of Maduro. She acknowledged that Mexico has since become a major source of petroleum for Cuba but said the volume of shipments remains consistent with historical levels.

Cuba Faces Expanded Travel Restrictions Under New Presidential Proclamation

On December 16, the Trump administration issued a presidential proclamation expanding travel restrictions to the US and limiting the issuance of non-immigrant visas for citizens of 19 countries, including Cuba. This development builds on the June 9 partial travel ban on Cuba, which suspended the entry of Cuban nationals into the US.

The December 16 presidential proclamation removed the following exemptions:

Certain immediate relative immigrant visas (spouses, children, and parents of U.S. citizens)
Adoptions by U.S. citizens

The proclamation took effect on January 1, 2026, and applies only to foreign nationals outside of the US who did not hold a visa on the effective date. Individuals who already hold valid visas are not subject to the proclamation.

Miami-Dade Revokes Business Licenses Over Cuba Compliance Issues

In a statement released on December 22, Miami-Dade County Tax Collector Dariel Fernandez announced the revocation of tax licenses for more than two dozen businesses on the premise of failing to provide sufficient documentation that they were not engaged in business with Cuba.

This follows a warning he gave in September, explaining that doing business with Cuba violates U.S. sanctions. Additionally, he cites the Florida Statute, which allows any local governing authority to revoke or refuse to renew an occupational license for any entity doing business with Cuba.

An initial round of letters was sent to 75 businesses on October 28. The letters requested a license issued by either the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and/or the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). Of the 75 businesses, 48 provided the requested information. On November 25, the remaining businesses were sent a second round of notices. Fernandez’s statement included a list of 20 businesses that failed to provide proper documentation and may now be unable to legally operate in Miami-Dade County.

At the time of this writing, the federal government has not conducted audits of the listed companies to determine if they were breaking federal law. Fernandez states that more letters will follow and more businesses will be shut down.

Recommended Reading, Listening & Viewing:

Context on Venezuela and regional spillover

Watch | Carnegie Endowment: The Trump Administration and Venezuela: What Now? 

Listen | El Hilo (Spanish): Venezuela después de Maduro

Read | Foreign Affairs: The Shock Waves of Venezuela

Read | Foreign Affairs: The End of the Beginning in Venezuela

Implications for Cuba’s economy and politics

Read | TIME: Trump Can’t Make Cuba Great Again. Only Cubans Can Do It.

Read | WSJ: Cuba Is Already on the Brink. Maduro’s Ouster Brings It Closer to Collapse.

Read | NYT: Cuba’s Long-Suffering Economy Is Now in ‘Free Fall’

Read | CNN: Cuba is left reeling in the aftermath of the Venezuela strike

Read | The Guardian: Can Cuba’s bond with Venezuela survive Trump’s ousting of Maduro?