Special Edition #2: How Cuban Communities Are Reacting to Maduro’s Fall
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As mainstream coverage of Cuba accelerates, CEDA brings you another Special Edition News Brief focused on what often gets lost: the voices and perspectives of Cubans themselves. This edition features insights from Cubans on the island, members of the diaspora, and perspectives from within Cuba’s government to help cut through the noise and provide grounded, on-the-ground analysis.
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Over the weekend, President Donald Trump escalated rhetoric toward Cuba with a series of highly symbolic and provocative posts. He shared an image of himself smoking a cigar in Havana, and later responded approvingly to a post suggesting Marco Rubio will be the next president of Cuba, writing, “Sounds good to me!” While the latter remark may have been satirical, the message was clear: the Trump administration is openly signaling support for regime change in Cuba, a position aligned with its broader regional agenda many now refer to as the “Donroe Doctrine”—and now formally embedded in U.S. foreign policy planning. In the recently published U.S. Department of State’s Agency Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2026–2030, goal two is explicitly framed as “The Western Hemisphere and Establishment of the Donroe Doctrine,” making this approach not just rhetoric but an articulated strategic priority.
On January 11, President Trump raised the stakes, posting on Truth Social, “…THERE WILL BE NO MORE OIL OR MONEY GOING TO CUBA - ZERO! I strongly suggest they make a deal, BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.” He reiterated these remarks to the press, stating, "We're talking to Cuba, and you'll find out pretty soon..." Cuba’s President Miguel Díaz-Canel responded swiftly on X: “There are no conversations with the U.S. government, except for technical contacts in the migration field.” What “deal” the Trump administration is seeking remains unclear and how this “deal” would come to fruition remains a big question as diplomatic channels between the US and Cuba are limited.
Since January, the Trump administration has reinstated Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, rescinded the CHNV parole program that afforded Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans a legal pathway to enter the U.S., and tightened travel restrictions for Cubans, and just this week, announced the suspension of immigrant visas for Cubans, alongside those from 74 other countries. Together, these moves further strain conditions on an island already grappling with severe shortages and relentless blackouts. To better understand the bigger picture, you can view CEDA’s Cuban Migration Numbers.
At the same time, so far, the Trump administration has stopped short of measures that would truly cripple the Cuban state. It has not cut off remittances entirely, eliminated family travel, or taken steps to block Mexico’s oil shipments to the island.
U.S. officials confirmed that Mexico will continue supplying oil to Cuba, a critical lifeline since 2023 and especially now following the halt of shipments from Venezuela. Venezuela has supplied roughly half of Cuba’s net oil deficit, and some estimates suggest that Mexico surpassed Venezuela as Cuba’s top oil supplier in 2025. Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum has repeatedly framed these oil shipments as “humanitarian aid” and has even offered to serve as a mediator between Washington and Havana.
As CEDA’s Executive Director, María José Espinosa, remarked on BBC, even with Mexico’s assistance, the energy crisis in Cuba will quickly become a national stability crisis. Moreover, as the Cuba Study Group notes, even if Venezuelan oil shipments resume, they are likely to arrive “with reduced subsidies, greater oversight, and uncomfortable strings attached.” Meanwhile, intensified U.S. maritime enforcement—including the seizure of at least 6 oil tankers—raises serious questions about how, and from whom, Cuba will secure adequate fuel in the months ahead.
Across the hemisphere, initial condemnations of recent U.S. actions quickly gave way to quiet backchannel diplomacy, and since President Trump’s January 11 threat to cut off “oil or money” to Cuba, public pushback from regional governments on Cuba specifically has been far more muted. No regional government has publicly and explicitly argued against recent U.S. government statements or raised alarm about the humanitarian consequences of reduced oil access.
This silence reflects a familiar pattern stemming from leaders’ fear of upsetting President Trump. In fact, in October, Argentina and Paraguay abstained or voted against a UN resolution calling for an end to the U.S. embargo on Cuba, underscoring a growing regional tendency to demonstrate ideological alignment with the Trump administration.
Yet even before Maduro’s ouster, Cuba’s economy was already in survival mode. In December, the New York Times reported that Cuba had been reselling much of the subsidized oil it receives from Venezuela to China despite widespread blackouts across the island. A recent elTOQUE investigation similarly found that despite over $1.15 billion reportedly allocated to energy infrastructure, improvements have not translated into daily relief for most Cubans.
However, as William LeoGrande, Professor of Government at American University, aptly points out,
“Washington officials have been predicting the imminent end of the Cuban government since 1959…They have been so consistently wrong because although economic despair often causes political discontent, it does not automatically give rise to an opposition movement capable of overthrowing the government.”
Even CIA analysis found that while Cuba’s economy is extremely fragile, it is not certain that economic hardship would translate into political collapse.
So how are Cubans across the globe reacting to the current moment?
Cuba’s government has adopted a posture of military signaling, broadcasting exercises and speeches by senior officers on state television—largely symbolic gestures given aging equipment and lack of readiness. Meanwhile, U.S. Navy aircraft have been tracked near the island, though no immediate action appears likely.
On the island, the Christian Center for Reflection and Dialogue, An independent Christian organization that promotes spirituality, dignity, human rights, conflict resolution through reconciliatory dialogue, and participation in community empowerment processes, released a statement expressing hope for dialogue, reconciliation, and peace, calling for all Cubans to work together to create an environment of mutual understanding.
Public opinion data offer a more nuanced picture. Independent digital media outlet elTOQUE surveyed 14,025 Cubans on the island and abroad and found that 43.6 percent believe dialogue with the US should prioritize the release of political prisoners and respect for human rights. Among respondents living on the island, however, the economic and energy crisis ranked as the top concern, with political rights close behind. Migration and family reunification ranked relatively low across all groups.
elTOQUE cautions that this survey may not be statistically representative, given the limitations on freedom of speech on the island. Still, the findings underscore a central reality: while geopolitical maneuvering dominates headlines, Cubans themselves remain focused on survival, dignity, and stability amid deepening uncertainty.
To better understand how this uncertainty is felt beyond the island, CEDA spoke with Julio Antonio Fernández Estrada, a Cuban lawyer and university professor. He has lived abroad since February 2022.
Asked whether Maduro’s ousting had changed his outlook on Cuba’s future, he responded: “I have felt that my pessimism has grown. It seems to me that there is not much to expect from the United States government or the international community in a possible scenario of a violent fall of the Havana government.”
He went on to warn that Washington’s posture offers little reassurance for Cuban civil society: “Unfortunately, it has been shown that the current US administration does not respect what may happen in Cuban civil society or the possible dialogue that could be envisioned by representatives of the Cuban bureaucracy and the opposition and dissidents inside and outside of Cuba… I don't think we should expect the current US government to be concerned about democracy, human rights, or the rule of law in Cuba.”
When asked how he interprets the administration’s recent rhetoric toward Cuba, Fernández Estrada described it as both dangerous and consequential: “It is threatening rhetoric, but I don't think it should be taken lightly or frivolously…The US government would welcome the fall of the Havana regime, but we know that, in the harsh reality of politics, Cuba is of less strategic importance than the United States.”
Even so, he cautioned against dismissing the rhetoric as empty posturing: “I don't think it's rhetoric disconnected from reality… Even if this rhetoric is alarmist and exaggerated, we must acknowledge that it has a destabilizing and demotivating effect on the Cuban people.”
This week in Cuba news…
US Moves Forward With $3 Million in Hurricane Assistance to Cuba
According to a statement made on January 14 by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the US will follow through with the previous $3 million commitment made to the Cuban people in the aftermath of Hurricane Melissa in October of 2025, a gesture that Cuba acknowledged with rare public gratitude. The announcement outlined the shipment of the aid via a two-flight series through a two-series flight, with one that departed on January 14 and the scheduled for January 16. The assistance is said to include food, hygiene kits, and “other essential items.” It is projected to reach 6,000 families in the provinces of Santiago de Cuba, Holguín, Granma, and Guantánamo.
In an X post, Secretary Rubio stated that the US is working with the Catholic Church and other partners on the ground to ensure that aid reaches the Cuban people directly. The United Nations (UN) estimated that more than 1.7 million people were affected by the hurricane. While Cuba’s government has relied heavily on donations from other countries to support recovery efforts, the UN estimated that Cuba required $74 million to meet those needs, underscoring the continued strain on the island as it confronts overlapping humanitarian and economic challenges.
The announcement prompted criticism from Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which released a statement accusing the US of exploiting humanitarian aid for political purposes. Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla later wrote on X, “As a principle, #Cuba does not oppose assistance coming from governments or organizations.”
Trump Administration Halts Immigrant Visa Processing for Cubans
On January 14, the State Department announced that immigrant visa processing for 75 countries, including Cuba, will be suspended starting January 21. The department said the pause will remain in place while it reassesses immigration procedures to prevent the entry of foreign nationals who “would take welfare and public benefits.” The suspension does not affect nonimmigrant visas, including student and tourist visas.
This development expands the Trump administration’s broader crackdown on immigration. On January 12, the State Department announced that it had revoked more than 100,000 visas. The announcement specified that 8,000 were student visas and 2,500 were specialized visas issued to individuals who had encounters with U.S. law enforcement related to criminal activity.
In a separate statement, the State Department said the visa freeze will remain active until the US can ensure that new immigrants will not extract wealth from the American people, again citing welfare and public benefits as a concern. However, most visa holders face restrictions on the types of public benefits they are eligible to receive.
Cuba Displays Bodies of 32 Cubans Who Died in Venezuela
On January 14, the remains of 32 Cuban officers killed during the U.S. strikes on Venezuela were returned to Cuba for formal military ceremonies and burials. Thousands of Cubans gathered to pay their respects, including soldiers who were wounded in Venezuela. The officers were members of the Cuban security forces known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Ministry of the Interior and were on a mission agreed upon by both governments to protect Nicolás Maduro.
The remains were placed at the headquarters of the Ministry of the Armed Forces in Havana to allow the public to attend memorial observances. A large, government-organized demonstration took place on January 16 in honor of the officers.
Mexico Will Continue Exporting Oil to Cuba
Despite President Trump’s statement on X that there will be no more oil going to Cuba, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright and another U.S. official confirmed that current U.S. policy allows Mexico to continue providing oil to the island.
In her January 6 press conference, President Sheinbaum explained that the oil shipments are provided under contracts between the two nations, while strongly emphasizing their humanitarian purpose. However, Mexico’s government has yet to provide data outlining the conditions of the supply, including how much is counted as humanitarian aid, what percentage is sold, and how the contracts are structured. President Sheinbaum affirmed that her administration is willing to share that information, though she did not specify a timeline.
Following the shipment of 80,000 barrels of oil to Cuba in December, Congressman Carlos Giménez (FL 28) released a statement denouncing Mexico’s actions and encouraging the nation to stop “gifting” oil to Cuba. In her January 12 press conference, President Sheinbaum responded by affirming that the people of Mexico do not appear to be concerned, noting that there has been no fuel shortage or increase in fuel prices. In the same conference, President Sheinbaum also stated that Mexico would be willing to serve as a mediator between the US and Cuba, should both nations see fit.
Recommended Reading, Listening & Viewing:
Read | Responsible Statescraft: Trump will be sore when Cuba domino refuses to fall
Read | Bloomberg: US Warns Cuba’s Leadership: ‘Don’t Play Games’ With Trump
Read | El País: Trump aims to strangle Cuba, but Cubans say this only punishes them
Read | The Nation: Trump’s Naked Imperialism
Read | The Economist: Cuba’s regime is in dire straits
Read | OnCuba News (Spanish): Cuba ante EEUU: lecciones y antilecciones de la intervención en Venezuela
Read | Public Books: Will Cuban Americans Choose Trumpism, or Solidarity
Read | The New Yorker: How Marco Rubio Went from “Little Marco” to Trump’s Foreign-Policy Enabler
Read | BBC News Mundo (Spanish): Cómo queda Cuba tras la caída de Maduro en Venezuela y por qué el petróleo de México pasa a ser clave