Poverty In Cuba Today
(1) Poverty today: You’ve described poverty in Cuba as increasingly structural. What does that look like in 2026 in concrete terms, and how are households adapting when they can no longer meet basic needs?
The four months that have elapsed in the new year have done nothing but accentuate social disadvantages and entrench their structural nature. Added to the already established shortages and difficulties regarding access to food, medicines, healthcare services, community sanitation, transportation, and household water and energy, the severance of ties with Venezuela, along with the new oil embargo imposed by the U.S. administration, has tightened the screws even further on this scenario of increasing precarity.
In my view, the government’s response to this polycrisis continues to fail to grasp its complexity and depth; the measures implemented fall far short, by a wide margin, of the changes and solutions that are truly needed, and they fail to address the structural foundations of poverty and inequality, tending instead to reproduce them.
Households are compelled to adapt as best they can under conditions where daily life and its associated needs serve as a downward-adjusting variable, one whose standards are not restored by any of the measures implemented to date, but rather tend to decline. Family strategies for survival and risk management depend on available assets: income (from employment, remittances, or business ventures), tangible assets that can be monetized, and support networks utilized either for immediate survival or to access opportunities.
Among poor or low-income groups, I have observed a spectrum of strategies in operation, many of which inflict some form of harm upon the family, whether immediately or in the medium term. These include actions taken to ensure the purchase of food by curtailing other expenses that address essential needs: forgoing home repairs, clothing, leisure activities, and personal hygiene items to focus solely on the bare minimum; reducing spending on healthcare and education; abandoning medical treatments; and adults cutting back on their own food consumption in order to protect children or sick family members.
Other strategies aim to expand the household budget or improve consumption levels, such as young people who decide to drop out of school to pursue work that generates income; adult family members who take on multiple jobs or engage in informal, sporadic, and often precarious paid tasks; children and adolescents who perform odd jobs in exchange for cash, food, or goods; adult members who assist other families and friends in hopes of receiving some monetary or material support in return; the production and sale of goods for micro-scale markets with low quality standards (e.g., fried foods, coffee, frozen treats); renting out the home or a portion of it; selling productive assets (tools or work equipment, cars, motorcycles, breeding livestock); selling household goods (washing machines, televisions, furniture, refrigerators, stoves, telephones, computer equipment); selling the home or a portion of it; and borrowing money or incurring debt.
Growing food crops or raising livestock in the backyard, or on land belonging to friends and/or relatives, and soliciting monetary or material aid from family members are also tactics used to weather the storm. Of course, emigration remains the ultimate aspirational strategy, particularly for young people and young adults, though it remains an attainable goal for only a few.
Meanwhile, extremely precarious forms of employment, begging, and prostitution emerge, bringing with them their attendant harms.
(1a) A widely cited September 2025 report from the Observatorio cubano de derechos humanos found that 89% of Cubans live in extreme poverty. Around the same time, you calculated, based upon data from Dr. Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, that roughly 40–45% of Cubans were living in poverty. More broadly, what data, access, and institutional capacity would be needed to measure poverty in Cuba more accurately and transparently?
I am not in the best position to dispute the results of surveys regarding poverty in Cuba, as I lack the essential information required for their calculation: personal and household income, and the extent to which essential needs are met. Such data is not publicly available in Cuba. Nor do I possess the financial, political, or institutional resources that would enable me to conduct my own quantitative statistical research, utilizing a representative sample and an internationally validated methodology.
Under these circumstances and in 2025, taking as my guide the basic needs basket calculated by Omar Everleny Pérez (which is far more realistic than the one employed during the *Tarea Ordenamiento*), I cross-referenced available information regarding occupational structure, employment in the public and private sectors, wages, pensions, private-sector earnings, and remittances. I weighed this data against average household size and the estimated proportion of low-income elderly adults living alone, ultimately arriving at an estimate of 45% of the population living in a state of economic poverty—defined as individuals whose income is insufficient to cover their essential needs, particularly those related to food.
The information I utilized was gathered at various times and drawn from diverse sources: official statistics from the ONEI; UNICEF reports such as the 2019 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) and the 2024 report on child food poverty; prior quantitative and qualitative studies; and my own observations and interviews conducted across different regions of the country. Consequently, this figure does not constitute conclusive data; rather, it serves merely as an indicator of a "red flag" which, in the face of official silence or downplaying of the issue, highlights the alarmingly high number of impoverished people within the population.
Poverty exists in degrees; within that 45% figure, there are moderate, intermediate, and extreme situations the latter falling below the threshold of mere survival, a point at which existence becomes extremely fragile and subhuman. And, of course, a general process of the precarization of daily life is evident, affecting society as a whole, to a greater or lesser extent, depending on income levels, social networks, and available opportunities.
Regarding the statistic claiming that 89% of Cuban families live in extreme poverty, along with the assertion that 7 out of every 10 people forgo at least one meal a day, the study relies on a sample size that appears too small to yield a statistically representative, quantitative measurement of poverty. Since the report does not include the actual survey instrument, it is impossible to evaluate the methodology employed or the specific questions asked. Nor does it explain how the sample was controlled when utilizing digital means of data collection. It may well be, therefore, that this is more of a study on *perceptions* of poverty. Ultimately, the report fails to provide sufficient evidence to enable one to form a definitive opinion.
A useful cross-check to help contextualize the validity of the sample used in this study involves the finding that, according to the report, only 37% of families receive remittances. This figure is, to say the least, striking. Previous studies have reported much higher proportions specifically, 66% according to Mesa-Lago. Given the significant surge in emigration over recent years, it is highly improbable that the percentage of families receiving remittances would not be higher than this. While the total monetary value of remittances sent to Cuba has indeed declined, the flow has by no means ceased; moreover, current forms of "in-kind remittances" such as pre-packaged "combos" of goods and payments made from abroad for various services (facilitated via WhatsApp and other digital platforms) are expanding significantly, ensuring that numerous families continue to receive vital support in the form of food, medication, and access to essential services.
The characteristics of the sample point toward an overrepresentation of the non-white population, within which lower-income groups carry greater weight. Both elements, remittances and skin color, seem to indicate that the study suffers from an underrepresentation of income groups situated above the poverty line.
Furthermore, using the extreme poverty threshold established by the World Bank in 2015, set at US$1.90, as a benchmark is a factor that, while providing a comparative sense of international living standards, tends to overlook specific national conditions that may either ameliorate or exacerbate that standard.
Household surveys, a methodology widely employed in Latin America, utilizing an income-based poverty line tailored to specific national contexts, make it possible to identify gaps between family income and the fulfillment of basic needs, as well as to calculate degrees of poverty and pinpoint areas suffering the greatest deprivation. I understand that the Ministry of Economy and Planning currently implements this methodology, or did so until recently, yet its data remains inaccessible to the public. This is an issue deemed to be of high political sensitivity; consequently, withholding its results deprives citizens of their right to access meaningful information regarding the national reality.
Quantitative and statistically representative research into income, needs, inequality, and poverty is costly, yet absolutely indispensable. I envision the possibility of assembling a consortium of academic institutions with expertise in this field, drawing upon resources from international cooperation initiatives (such as United Nations agencies), international technical advisory bodies (such as ECLAC) and involving social policy institutions as well as the citizenry. This collaborative research model would be characterized by transparency and designed to mobilize stakeholders toward the development of solutions and the fostering of solidarity.
(1b) As mentioned, those calculations were done in September 2025. More than six months later, conditions on the island have worsened significantly, particularly with the loss of key external fuel sources and the continued decline of Cuba’s aging energy system. How do you think poverty levels may have changed since then, and what indicators would you watch most closely to assess whether poverty has deepened, and by how much?
Omar Everleny Pérez recently recalculated the cost of living for an average household, demonstrating that it has risen from 45,401 CUP, estimated at the beginning of 2025, to 61,710 pesos today. The cost of a basic food basket for two people stands at 33,000 CUP per month, an increase of more than 8,000 CUP compared to the previous year. Costo de la vida - OnCubaNews. Meanwhile, the increase in wages and pensions continues to lag behind inflation.
Consequently, it is necessary to update poverty estimates, as this scourge has undoubtedly intensified. However, I cannot provide an answer at this moment; I have not yet finalized my new estimates. I am currently awaiting the Statistical Yearbook of Cuba 2025. The National Occupation Survey, preliminary findings from ongoing studies on remittances and private-sector income, and the results of my own research into everyday life practices and strategies, all in an effort to arrive at an assessment that is as close to reality as possible.
Beyond the numbers, which are essential for social policy formulation, I consider the study of everyday life to be indispensable for truly understanding situations of poverty. These situations are inherently heterogeneous, presenting distinct forms of harm as well as varying opportunities for intervention. This entails examining the practices and strategies deployed by households to cope with critical circumstances, as well as the self-perception of the individuals living through them, specifically, their own perspectives on what needs to be done, what they require, and how public policies can support them in their journey toward a life of dignity.
This type of observational approach makes it possible to distinguish varying degrees of severity in the precariousness of life within specific social groups and geographic areas. At the same time, by drawing directly upon the voices of the individuals involved, it facilitates the identification of potential solutions and pathways toward improvement.
(2) Policy gap: Cuba has adopted a new generation of social policies aimed at reducing vulnerability and inequality, yet conditions continue to worsen. Where is the disconnect, and what would need to change for these policies to have a real impact at scale?
Since 2019, Cuba has joined the wave of modernization, known in the Latin American region as "inclusion policies” (Nueva generación de políticas|CEPAL), characterized by a rights-based perspective, universalism sensitive to diversity, the redress of historical equity gaps, and the pivotal role of local-level policies and citizen participation in policy design, implementation, and evaluation, as well as the use of affirmative, targeted tools to prioritize groups in vulnerable situations.
Prominent among these initiatives are the Comprehensive Policy for Childhood, Adolescence, and Youth; the Program for the Advancement of Women; the National Program to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination; the National System for the Comprehensive Care of Life; the Program for the Care of Vulnerable Individuals, Families, and Communities; and the Comprehensive Strategy for the Prevention of and Response to Gender-Based and Domestic Violence.
The acknowledgment of the existence of and the need for differentiated care and protection regarding situations involving vulnerability, discrimination, and violence already constitutes a significant step forward in terms of strategic formulation. It moves beyond a homogenizing universalist perspective, one that lacks the sensitivity required to address the diverse needs and starting points of various social groups.
However, these initiatives make little headway in achieving concrete transformations and are hampered by a variety of barriers. Resource constraints constitute one such barrier, yet the problem is compounded by a disconnect between these policies and the critical urgencies currently facing the nation. These policies were formulated for relatively "normal" times, not for an era of "polycrisis." The current situation demands that, within the broader framework of priorities, a clear distinction be drawn between emergencies and urgent needs; furthermore, it requires accelerated action to protect the most vulnerable groups, specifically, at this juncture, those at the extremes of the life spectrum (the elderly and early childhood populations within low-income families), based on rapid local assessments and the differentiated allocation of scarce resources. These groups simply cannot afford to wait.
The specific amounts and sources of funding for these initiatives remain undisclosed; moreover, within the country’s annual national budget, projected expenditures for health, education, agriculture, and social security appear to fall far short of actual requirements.
Added to this are the sluggish pace of implementation, the lack of clarity regarding mechanisms and areas for prioritization and citizen participation, and the silent resistance, from authorities and bureaucracies at all levels, to modifying old, centralized formulas for resource allocation and decision-making, and to stepping outside their comfort zones and relinquishing their privileges. This resistance is so strong that it obstructs the progress of a reform that the PCC itself initiated.
The actions stemming from these policies are integrated into the Government’s 2026 Economic and Social Program, which authorities have defined as the guiding framework for planning and implementation regarding crisis management, revitalizing the economy, and addressing critical distortions, internal macroeconomic imbalances, and severe external shocks. It serves as the response to the intensifying "polycrisis" and appears to demonstrate a heightened awareness of the urgent challenges at hand (presidencia.gob.cu/media/filer/public/2026/04/01/programa_economico_y_social_del_gobierno_2026.pdf).
Notably, the program is accompanied by rapid measures designed to expand sources of foreign currency financing (such as facilitating and expediting foreign investment, including from Cuban emigrants, and establishing formal, user-friendly channels for sending remittances, among others). It also aims to progressively expand the reach of renewable energy, primarily solar, driven by domestic investment, support from international partners, and tax incentives designed to encourage its adoption by the private and household sectors. Healthcare services and essential productive activities are the first to benefit from these improvements in energy supply.
However, this roadmap retains, underlying its framework, an economistic perspective grounded in the "trickle-down" effect. This is not to say that social issues and corresponding social policies are omitted; indeed, a specific objective is dedicated to them, albeit one focused primarily on the restoration of services and the protection of individuals, families, households, and communities in vulnerable situations. While these are indispensable and urgent objectives, the social dimension ought to be organically interwoven with the economic dimension, rather than being treated merely as an expected byproduct of economic improvements.
The program leaves the political sphere untouched; it includes no transformations aimed at broadening citizen participation, nor does it propose deep economic transformations geared toward restoring a streamlined yet competent public sector, fostering cooperative production models, including social and solidarity economies, community-based initiatives, or socially responsible enterprises, or promoting inclusive economic activity. Yet, such measures would constitute the true key to generating economic inclusion opportunities capable of mitigating and overcoming existing disadvantages.
Furthermore, couched as a series of broad aspirational statements employing verbs such as “alcanzar”, “perfeccionar”, “fortalecer”, the Program fails to establish specific urgencies or priorities within its collective set of aspirations, nor does it outline the concrete means by which to attain them.
Most importantly, the structural foundations of poverty and inequality will remain undiminished by this plan.
What, then, would need to be done to achieve real, large-scale impact?
It would be presumptuous to attempt to answer this question from the solitude and comfort of an academic ivory tower. This is, rather, a task requiring a democratic, multidisciplinary, collaborative, and participatory formulation process, one that draws upon diverse forms of knowledge (including those of citizens, academics, and policymakers, among others) and which remains, as yet, unaccomplished.
I wish merely to suggest that the core concept boils down to implementing profound structural changes, changes that, while simultaneously securing the necessary financing to stimulate the economy and restore public services, are also seamlessly integrated with inclusion policies at the local level, placing particular emphasis on those actions designed to dismantle the very pillars upon which disadvantage is perpetuated. Much has already been written and proposed on this subject.
(3) Energy shock: How has the recent energy shock and tightening U.S. pressure translated into lived outcomes? Are we seeing a measurable deepening of poverty or a shift into more extreme forms of deprivation?
The “energy shock” leaves a clear and immediate imprint on people's lives: power outages are longer and more frequent across the country, including in the capital; public transportation is all but paralyzed; university and technical education have shifted to virtual or hybrid formats, even as internet connectivity remains scarce; broad segments of the workforce (in tourism, industry, and services, among others) have lost their jobs or seen their incomes slashed, as their productive activities depend on electricity; surgical procedures not deemed critically urgent are being postponed; cooking fuel is becoming increasingly scarce, forcing households to revert to using charcoal or firewood; and food preservation hangs by a thread due to the lack of refrigeration.
The fuel shortage, triggered the moment Trump’s measures were announced, drove up the cost of private transportation, charcoal, the small gas canisters sold on the black market, and even firewood; indeed, prices rose for nearly every product whose availability depends on transportation and energy.
I understand that this, in turn, leads to both a quantitative increase in the number of people living in economic poverty and the emergence of more extreme forms of deprivation. The former is linked to job losses, in both the formal and informal sectors, and to the rising cost of essential goods and services. The latter is a consequence of the weakening of social safety nets and their diminished capacity to provide protection.
(4) Leverage and pathways: Given the current mix of internal constraints and external pressures, where do you see the most realistic leverage for mitigating poverty in the short term—and what should policymakers, including those in the U.S., be paying attention to right now?
Realistic leverage for short-term poverty mitigation? Mitigation is a very modest, indeed insufficient, goal; however, it can serve as a moment to catch one's breath and set sights on more ambitious objectives.
Policymakers in the country should recognize that leveraging mitigation efforts requires a rapid combination of welfare-oriented and transformative tools. On one hand, this entails accelerating the identification and screening of situations involving the greatest precariousness, critical emergencies, and the groups suffering most acutely from them, in order to direct scarce available resources toward them to address their fundamental needs. These resources would be derived from restructuring the national budget and from local-level initiatives. Social work at the community level—along with its tools for identifying vulnerabilities and potential assets, is essential.
On the other hand, it calls for policies promoting economic development and job creation, featuring incentives for social inclusion at the local level, along with a full toolkit of inclusive finance instruments, training, advisory services, and care services, designed to enable disadvantaged groups to gain entry into more advantageous segments of the labor market.
Thirdly, within the context of emergencies and critical urgent needs, priority must be given to rescuing, initially at a bare minimum level, those services indispensable for the preservation of life: food, medicines, healthcare, and access to water and community sanitation. Furthermore, to sustain the emergency response and restore a minimum level of "normality" to daily life, the restoration of electricity services is imperative.
Stimulating solidarity networks, and incentivizing and coordinating support and contributions from citizen activists, volunteers, religious institutions, the private sector, the diaspora, and international aid organizations, can serve to mobilize resources capable of reaching specific communities and groups, thereby providing the means for "mitigation."
Finally, it is crucial to activate direct citizen participation in projects, consultations, and the formulation and implementation of initiatives aimed at the self-transformation of their own environments. The realm of "micropolitics" is absolutely essential for effective mitigation. If the true political will is to resume a course of social justice, it is imperative to cease viewing dissent, criticism, protest, and demands regarding social policies as a threat that power must discipline.
To the U.S. government: peace and a neighborly relationship characterized by harmony and respect for national sovereignty, free of sanctions, so that we may truly demonstrate what we are capable of achieving through our own decisions, both as a country and as a civil society.
