After 60 Years in the US, A Cuban Man Dies in ICE Custody
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The Trump administration is accelerating a hardline immigration agenda, one that is impacting Cubans in unprecedented ways. Long considered an exception to the harshest aspects of U.S. immigration enforcement, Cubans are now facing rising detention rates, deportations, and policy shifts that affect long-term residents and recent arrivals alike.
Last week, a 75-year-old Cuban man who paroled into the US as a teenager in 1966 died in ICE custody. His death underscores the growing precarity faced by immigrants amid sweeping enforcement changes. Meanwhile, the Trump Administration has announced the restoration of a hardline policy towards Cuba.
Migration enforcement is becoming the focus of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. This approach collapses complex political, economic, and humanitarian dynamics into questions of deterrence and enforcement, at the expense of human dignity, diplomacy, and long-term engagement. Cuba, long shaped by U.S. domestic politics, is once again at the center of this strategy.
In other immigration news:
Internal U.S. government records obtained by CBS showed the Trump administration recently transferred detainees who are nationals of African, Asian, European, and Caribbean countries to Guantánamo Bay detention facilities. As of Tuesday, 54 immigration detainees were being held at the facility amidst the Administration’s plans to rapidly increase detention numbers.
Under President Donald Trump’s “Big Beautiful Bill,” $170 billion in funding will be allocated for immigration enforcement and increased border security. This will make the annual ICE budget higher than the military expenditures of all but 15 countries.
See updated Cuban migration information and data here.
This week in Cuba news…
Trump Administration Announces New Sanctions and Travel Restrictions on Cuba
On June 30, the Trump administration published a National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) indicating new restrictions on trade with Cuba. The majority of the document is a reiteration of current U.S.-Cuba policy, including the reinforcement of travel restrictions that took effect on June 9.
The NSPM proposes:
Financial Transactions and Sanctions: A new list will be created and published identifying entities that are controlled by, act for, or benefit the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services (e.g., GAESA and its affiliates). Direct or indirect financial transactions with any entity on the list will be prohibited if such transactions disproportionately benefit those services at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise. The key update here is the inclusion of the word “indirect,” which will be challenging to implement in practice, but as noted by the Cuba Study Group, the threat alone could chill trade activity with Cuba.
Non-Academic Travel Requirements: The NSPM calls for Americans traveling to Cuba on a non-academic basis to “engage in a full-time schedule of activities that enhance contact with the Cuban people, support civil society in Cuba, or promote the Cuban people’s independence from Cuban authorities.” These requirements are largely consistent with pre-existing regulations but signal continued emphasis on limiting informal or leisure travel to Cuba.
Changes to the CACR: The NSPM does not authorize secondary sanctions, rather it prohibits indirect transactions with prohibited entities like GAESA or other Cuban military-linked individuals. Dr. William LeoGrande explains: “That is not a secondary sanction. It is just an expansion of the scope of the direct sanctions”
We discussed the updated Cuba restrictions in more detail with Dr. William LeoGrande, a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute and Associate Vice-Provost for Academic Affairs, Professor of Government, and Dean Emeritus of the School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington, D.C. He recently co-authored a report detailing a realist case for US engagement with Cuba.
CEDA: What stands out to you about the newly proposed NSPM?
LeoGrande: The timing is curious, coming just before Trump went to inaugurate “Alligator Alcatraz.” Perhaps the NSPM was timed to give South Florida Cuban American Republicans a consolation prize while Trump amps up the deportation of people in their communities. But the NSPM also came out the eve of the final House vote on the reconciliation budget bill. The first time the House voted on the bill, to secure their support, the Cuban American delegation forced Trump to cancel Chevron’s license to do business in Venezuela. Perhaps they demanded another, quid pro quo for their vote this time around.
The NSPM essentially restates the status quo by reissuing the NSPM from 2017, almost verbatim. Most of the 2017 sanctions are still in place, so the new NSPM does not signal an escalation in sanctions against Cuba. There are really only two differences between the new NSPM and the old one. First, the new one calls for the State Department to issue a new list of Restricted Entities linked to the Cuban armed forces, and to include Cuban entities that “act on behalf” of those entities, so presumably it will be a longer list than the old one. It also prohibits not only direct transactions with entities on the list, but also “indirect” transactions—which presumably means transactions that go through third parties not on the list. It’s hard to see how that can be enforced since external companies will have no way of knowing whether a direct transaction with a company not on the list will be interpreted by OFAC as an indirect transaction with a prohibited entity, and lead to fines. Perhaps that ambiguity is the point, raising the political risk of doing business with Cuba for everyone.
CEDA: How much impact do you see the potential secondary sanctions having?
LeoGrande: The NSPM does not authorize secondary sanctions. It simply calls for modest changes in the existing Cuban Asset Control Regulations (CACR), which only apply to “U.S. persons,” including foreign businesses that have a U.S. presence. Anyone who violates the CACR can be fined. The prohibition on indirect transactions with prohibited entities will probably expand the number of potential violations, but that is not a secondary sanction. It is just an expansion of the scope of the direct sanctions on Cuba.
Foreign businesses without a U.S. presence are not subject to the CACR. Secondary sanctions refer to sanctioning (not just fining) those companies for doing business with Cuba. To sanction such a company would mean limiting the ability of U.S. persons to do business with it—just like sanctions against Cuba limit our ability to engage with Cuba. That, obviously, would be far more serious than just fining the company, both for them and for Cuba. Faced with either halting business with Cuba or losing access to the U.S. market and financial system, most companies would probably abandon Cuba. But imposing secondary sanctions would require new executive orders invoking the legislative authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
The takeaway: The newly announced measures are likely to negatively affect trade and investment in Cuba, but they stop short of the most extreme measures floated in recent months. They largely echo restrictions already proposed or implemented during President Trump’s first term, which have remained in place since 2017, except for the last six days of the Biden administration. Their actual impact will hinge on how rigorously they are enforced and how much latitude agencies are given in implementation.
75-Year-Old Cuban American Who Lived in US for 60 Years Dies in ICE Custody
On June 26, 75-year-old Cuban national Isidro Pérez passed away while in ICE custody at the Krome Detention Center in Florida, according to an ICE press release. Pérez was paroled into the US in 1966, at the age of 16.
Earlier that day, Pérez reported chest pain to ICE Health Services Corps personnel. Emergency services reacted and administered “life-sustaining interventions,” to which Pérez initially responded. However, after being transported to Kendall Regional Medical Center, he was pronounced dead. This comes after Pérez spent twelve days at the hospital, only being discharged on June 25. The cause of death is still under investigation.
Pérez was paroled into the US in 1966 and had lived in the country for nearly 60 years. While ICE has not provided a full explanation for his detention, his recent inadmissibility finding under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) may be linked to prior criminal convictions. According to ICE, he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance on February 10, 1981, and January 25, 1984.
Pérez is the thirteenth person to die in ICE custody this year, and the second to die at the Krome Detention Facility. If this rate continues, the number of deaths in ICE facilities will more than double from 2024.
This follows growing public outcry over conditions at the Krome Detention Center, particularly after multiple detainee deaths in 2025. On June 5, Cuban detainees at the facility in southwest Miami-Dade staged a peaceful protest in the recreation yard, using their bodies and white cloth to spell out “SOS Cuba” and refusing to return indoors. Their protest came weeks after Democratic lawmakers sent a letter in early April raising concerns about inhumane conditions at Krome.
US Holds Detainees from Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Caribbean in Guantánamo Bay
Internal U.S. government records obtained by CBS revealed that the Trump administration recently transferred immigration detainees who are nationals of African, Asian, European, and Caribbean countries to the detention facilities at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba. The government records indicated that nationals of China, Jamaica, Liberia, and the United Kingdom were amongst the immigration detainees.
U.S. officials said most of the detainees at the base are considered “high-risk” detainees, however, reporting by CBS and other news organizations confirmed that detainees understood as “high-risk” and “low-risk” have been sent to Guantánamo Bay. In June, Politico reported the Administration was vetting over 9,000 migrants from different countries for transfer to the Guantánamo Bay Detention Center. The move to transfer more individuals to the facilities indicates that the Administration is following through with their plans to send increased numbers of migrants to the facility. As of Tuesday of this week, 54 immigration detainees were being held in Guantánamo Bay. According to Tom Cartwright at Witness at the Border, between February 4 through June 30, 645 people have been transferred to Guantánamo.
Members of Congress have criticized the Administration’s use of Guantánamo Bay to hold detainees, citing its exorbitant costs. Senator Gary Peters (MI) reported in May that the facility is costing an estimated $100,000 per day to hold each detainee. The Department of Defense reported to Congress back in May that it had spent $21 million transporting migrants to Guantánamo Bay on military aircraft between January 20 and April 8.
Mexico Continues Crucial Provisions of Oil and Fuel to Cuba
Mexico’s state-owned oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, continues to support Cuba as the island struggles to keep its power grid operational. In the first quarter of this year, Pemex sold 3.1 billion pesos ($166 million) of crude and fuel to Cuba through its subsidiary Gasolinas Bienestar. The amount of exports—19,600 barrels of oil per day and 2,000 barrels of petroleum products per day—indicate an increase from the 19,900 barrels a day Pemex shipped to Cuba in the second half of 2023.
In the face of decreased fuel imports from traditional sources such as Russia and Venezuela, Cuba has increasingly looked to other allies for support as the island endures an intense energy crisis. Prior to 2023, Mexico had sporadically delivered energy shipments to Cuba, but over the course of 2023, Mexico surpassed Russia as a crucial energy supplier to the island. Mexico’s government describes the energy shipments as humanitarian support for Cuba.
Cuban Visas Go Digital; Last for 90 Days
The government of Cuba released information about a new electronic visa that went into effect on July 1. International travelers can now request the new electronic tourist visa through Cuba’s official government portal. The new visa allows for a single entry and up to 90 days of stay, with the option to extend for another 60 days. According to Cuba’s Ministry of Tourism, physical tourist cards are no longer issued at Cuban consulates. The requirement to obtain the new tourist visa does not apply to individuals who still hold Cuban citizenship.
These new requirements come at a time when tourism has significantly contracted in Cuba. According to data from the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI), tourism between January and April of 2025 saw a 21.1 percent decrease in visitors from the amount recorded in the same period of 2024.
Cuban Women’s National Volleyball Team Denied Visas, Preventing Tournament Appearance
The Cuban Volleyball Federation said last week that the Cuban Women’s National Volleyball Team had their visa request for entry to the US denied. The team was scheduled to play in the NORCECA Women’s Final Four tournament in Manatí, Puerto Rico. In early June, the US added Cuba to a list of countries with restrictions for entering the US or its territories. However, professional athletes and coaches participating in major events are supposedly exempted from this ban.
Proposed Legislation Would Allow Trans People in Cuba to Change Their Names
Lawmakers in Cuba are set to pass a landmark bill eliminating bureaucratic barriers that have made the process of officially changing an individual’s name difficult. This effort comes a few years after the 2022 approval of Cuba’s “family code,” a law that greenlit same-sex marriage and received international acclaim as a crucial step for the advancement of LGBTQ rights. The landmark bill would remove hurdles for legal name changes and change Cuba’s civil registry, allowing individuals to change their name at will. The bill is likely to pass before the end of this month.
Recommended Reading, Viewing, Events:
📖 Read | Council on Foreign Relations: The Unlikely Biden-Trump Throughline on Cuba
📖 Read | The Economist: Cuba’s leaders fiddle the figures
📖 Read | Reuters: China is quietly supplanting Russia as Cuba's main benefactor
📖 Read | CBS: A 10-year-old Cuban girl was preparing to join her mother in Miami. Then Trump's travel ban took effect.
📖 Read | Miami Herald: Miss Universe Cuba pageant to be held in Hialeah – and you can go for free
📖 Read | Quincy Institute: U.S.-Cuba Relations: A Realist Case for Pragmatic Engagement
